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Chapter One:  
An Introduction to Internationalization 
 
This May 2021, 日本国憲法, in English, the Constitution of Japan, will celebrate its 74th 
anniversary since it was enacted. The Constitution of Japan has never been amended.  
In December 2020, the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
celebrated its 25th anniversary. This document includes the Bosnian Constitution in Annex Four 
of the Peace Agreement, and it has never been amended.   
 
These constitutions represent a unique subset of constitutions because they are both 
internationalized, meaning that both constitutions were crafted, or at the very least heavily 
influenced by foreigners during the state-building exercises that took place following disastrous 
conflicts. Despite the large differences in the context of the cases and historical legacies, both 
internationalized constitutions have largely remained untouched since their enactment.  
  At first, the term ‘internationalized constitution,’ seems contradictory in itself. A 
constitution, at least in American mythology, is supposed to represent the ideals of a country, and 
also outlines the laws and norms of a state, its governance structure and the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the people. Constitutions are supposed to be context specific and reflect the will 
of the population they seek to serve, so how can a constitution be internationalized and represent 
the population of a specific country?  
These internationalized constitutions seek to balance the imposition of international 
ideals with local ownership in a guiding document for a newly rebuilt state. In this work, I will 




structural ownership, which means involving domestic actors in the planning and design in the 
state-building process, especially in the guiding documents of a state like the Constitution. A 
democratic and iterative constitution-making process is an outcome of centering structural 
ownership in state-building strategy. This argument is based on the comparison of my two cases: 
Japan and Bosnia. Through the comparison between my two cases the determining factor in a 
successful state-building project was the democratic involvement in the constitution-making 
process as a result of state-builders focusing on structural ownership. Then, with elections, where 
structural ownership was developed, functional ownership, the involvement of the population in 
the implementation of state-building projects, thrived as international ideals were adopted into 
the domestic governance structures. Structural and functional ownership make up the concept of 
local ownership and are imperative in building a successful state. In my case studies, different 
strategies are utilized to build a state, one emphasizing structural ownership and the other 
emphasizing functional ownership. Emphasizing structural ownership leads to the inclusion of 
domestic actors in the planning and design of the state-building process, which leads to 
democratic constitution-making processes to build a successful state.  
Local Ownership 
The issue of local ownership arises any time there is international intervention, as there 
can be conflict between international and local actors’ ideas of the state. Local ownership in this 
thesis refers to the involvement in the design and implementation of political processes by 
domestic actors (Donais 2009). Achieving local ownership is imperative to any state-building 
project, for local ownership also connotes the acceptance and adoption of structures or 




I emphasize local ownership because the concept of domestic actors being involved in the 
implementation and design of political systems is in opposition to the concept of international 
state-building and internationalized constitutions, where international and outside figures are in 
control of political processes. The shift of power from international state-builders to domestic 
actors is an inevitable part of any state-building process because international state-builders tend 
to intervene for short periods of time, not indefinitely.  The way the transition of power is 
handled can lead to success or failure of the state-building project generally.  For example, 
handing local ownership over too early after a conflict can lead to the society reverting back to 
its pre-war context and solidifying divides within a society through the democratic process. 
Handing local ownership over too late can lead to the target state developing a strong 
dependency on outsiders to provide support.  
 Local ownership is the key criteria to measure the success of a state-building project. A 
state-building project is only successful if the institutions, structures and values that are 
implemented by international state-builders remain after the international community exits the 
state. The outcomes of state-building will only remain if the local population adopts them into 
their own political structure. Otherwise, failure of the domestic population to adopt outcomes 
will lead to the collapse of the structures and values of the internationally built state. Therefore, it 
is of the utmost importance for the guiding document of a state, the constitution, to be adopted 
and embraced, so it can be solidified as a foundation for future state-building endeavors. If the 
constitution is not accepted by the local population, the foundation of any state is at risk.  
 I will be using the concepts of functional and structural ownership developed by Perry 




on the inclusion of local actors in the implementation of projects, while structural ownership 
involves domestic actors participating in the structuring and design of long-term strategies, 
policy priorities and initiatives for achieving long-term goals (Perry and Keil 2016). 
Constitution-Making 
 Constitution making is the process of crafting and writing a constitution. Constitution-
making can refer to actions by international and domestic actors that participate in crafting a 
constitution, and in this thesis I will focus on the internationalized constitutions and the 
internationalized constitution-making process.  
 There is evidence, both primary and secondary, that show the great influence that 
international arbiters had in the creation of both the new post-war Japanese and Bosnian 
Constitutions. Primary evidence takes the form of government memos and reports, while 
secondary evidence often comes from participants in their memoirs and other histories on the 
topic.  
 Constitution-making is one part of the state-building process, but it is incredibly 
important because of the multitude of ways a constitution functions in a society. In both my 
cases, the Constitution was a primary concern for both establishing peace, and laying the 
groundwork for institutional and political structure.  
State-Building 
 The term state-building in this thesis will be defined as the attempt to reconstruct, or 
construct for the first time, autonomous governance structures, where capacity is lacking or 




create an operational state especially after physically, socially and politically destructive 
conflicts. Although state-building extends over a broad range of activities, this thesis will focus 
on the construction of the constitution, which lays the groundwork for the political structures of 
the states at hand.  
 The concept of state-building can be controversial because it assumes there is legitimacy 
in outside interveners building capacity within a state that is not their own. Sometimes state-
building is compared to neo-colonialism as outside states are imposing their wills on weaker or 
failed states to create a state in the image of themselves, which is usually Western. I intend to 
reckon with the idea of legitimacy through the exploration of local ownership, to understand the 
stake the domestic actors have in the state-building process and how domestic actors’ 
involvement translates to state-building outcomes.  
Methodology 
 In order to understand how local ownership is developed in the process of constitution-
making for internationalized constitutions, I compare two cases that maintain internationalized 
constitutions, Japan and Bosnia. I chose to compare Japan and Bosnia because both countries 
experienced international intervention through state-building after socially, politically and 
physically destructive conflicts, and both countries retain un-amended internationalized 
constitutions that were products of state-building.  
 Throughout the analysis section, I compare and contrast different parts of the 
constitution-making process, including the documents that marked the end of war, the process of 
constitution-making itself and the final constitutional content. This side by side comparison 




cases. I keep in mind the contextual factors and historical legacies because they do bare greatly 
on all parts of the constitution-making process. Despite, the differences in context and history, 
there are some similarities between cases. For example, both conflicts in Japan and Bosnia were 
exacerbated by militarized political figures in powerful positions, which involved the creation 
and dissemination of propaganda and other informational campaigns. Yet, in the case of Japan 
one of the tenets of state-building from the post-war document included the purge of these 
figures from their leadership positions, while in Bosnia no such purge occurred and militaristic 
figures continued to have a hand in political events. 
 Comparisons like the example above help to understand the approaches of the 
international state-builders towards local ownership, constitution-making and the final outcomes 
of the constitutions. Both the constitution-making process and the final constitution reflect the 
amount of local ownership handed over. The tenets of both constitutions outline where the power 
of the governance structure originates, and how power is allocated throughout the political 
system generally.  
 These comparisons are arrived at through the use of primary and secondary sources. For 
Japan, the primary sources stem from the U.S. Office of the Historian and include digitized 
telegrams, memos and reports from American representatives of the State and War Departments 
or the Military. For Bosnia, the primary sources are the reports by the Office of the High 
Representative to the Peace Implementation Council about the status of the state-building project 
in the region. In addition to primary sources, I also used memoirs from important figures within 
both state-building cases, historical accounts, journal articles and books pertaining to state-





Following this Introduction, Chapter Two is a literature review that will touch on 
important concepts and build the analytical framework for this work. Next, Chapter Three is 
historical background that will outline important pre-war, war-time and post-war context for both 
cases. Chapter Four is the first part of the analysis and includes the comparisons between the 
cases of Japan and Bosnia during their constitution making process, including the situation at the 
end of the conflict, constitution-making process itself, and then an outline of the integral parts of 
the Constitution and the Governance structure. Chapter Five is a continuation of the analysis 
which considers how local ownership arises from the constitution-making process reviewed in 
the earlier chapter, and then how local ownership played a role in the inaugural elections of both 
countries and transitions of the cases’ state-building projects. Chapter Six is the conclusion, 













Literature Review  
 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter I introduce the analytical framework I use to link constitution-making as a part 
of state-building projects to local ownership by the domestic population of the target state. I first 
introduce the concepts of the state and state-building. I then explore the importance of 
constitutions, internationalized constitutions and constitution-making. Last, I define local 
ownership and touch upon some of the characteristics that can affect the potential for local 
ownership.  
II. States and State-Building  
What is a State? 
States are the basis of our global order, yet in many scholarly works a single definition of 
state is lacking. The working definition I use comes from Max Weber, who defined the state as 
the association of institutions that successfully maintain a monopoly on legitimate authority over 
a recognized territory (Lottholz and Lemay-Hébert 2016). I add to Weber’s definition with input 
from Rotberg, who emphasizes the responsibility of the state to provide political goods like 
security, laws and norms to settle disputes, protection of freedoms, and in modern states public 
goods like health care, education, a national banking system or infrastructure (Rotberg 2010).  
In sum, a state is a recognized territory led by a structure of institutions that maintain a 
monopoly of the use of force, but also have the ability and responsibility to provide political 





What is state-building? 
State-building refers to the attempt to reconstruct, or assemble for the first time, effective and 
autonomous governance structures, in places where governance capacity is lacking or completely 
missing (Caplan 2005). I will use the terms governance structures and institutions 
interchangeably throughout this thesis to refer to the mechanisms of a state that seek to provide 
political goods as described by Rotberg, like security, laws and norms and freedoms. For 
example, the constitution of any country is made to establish the laws and norms, therefore 
making it an institution and part of the governance structure. Many definitions of state-building 
focus on the building of governing institutions specifically, but often, state-building exercises 
encompass more than simply setting up a government, and can come to describe any and all 
forms of international assistance to countries that have experienced or are at risk of armed 
conflict (Chesterman 2004).  
State-building can refer to the project of building a state by the domestic government of a 
country, or state-building can refer to an international project in which foreign interveners seek 
to build up or assist in building up state apparatus. In this thesis, I focus on the latter.  The 
qualities of state-building that are most important to understand for my definition of state-
building for this project are that state-building (1) is led by and involves foreign powers; (2) is an 
attempt to create some form of governance structure whether that be brand new to the country, or 
rebuilding an old schema; and (3) has the end goal of an independent and autonomous state.  
How does state-building work? 
There is no singular method to state-build. State-building can be executed in a variety of 




with force from the military, through non-governmental organizations, through 
intergovernmental organizations, like the UN and the EU, or a combination of such. Depending 
on the breadth of the state-building project and the level of investment, foreign powers can take 
on the role of observer, trainer or administrator, and therefore a varied level of involvement in 
the process (Miller n.d.).  
 State-building processes can extend beyond building institutions and governance 
structures. Projects like the physical (re)building of infrastructure, (re)building of the economy, 
reconciliation within society, ending violence and securing peace can become part of the scope 
of state-building once they are linked to the goal of building state institutions. State-building 
projects have the potential to seep into every aspect of a state because state activities are 
interdependent. For example, if one wants to create a democratic election system, the 
prerequisites can include ensuring citizens can travel to polling places through adequate physical 
infrastructure and transportation, preventing violence, and informing the public about where and 
how to vote. While the main goal is to establish democratic elections, other projects must be 
included to ensure successful elections.  
Why do foreign countries state-build in other countries? 
 The consensus among many scholars and foreign policy makers is that weak and failed 
states create a security threat for the international community. State-building missions are 
undertaken to secure peace (Dobbins 2003; Fukuyama 2004). Notably, in a RAND corporation 
report from 2003, the conclusion was that “[state]-building is the responsibility of the world’s 
only superpower,” referring to the United States specifically (Dobbins 2003: xv). Francis 




serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism” (Fukuyama 
2004 :17). After September 11th, there was a renewed focus on state-building because policy 
makers believed that such violent attacks originated in places with weak state structures. Many 
policy makers inextricably linked violence to weak, poor and failing states, and therefore 
believed if they could build strong and reliable states, they could prevent violence and its growth 
all together. 
When and where do countries state-build? 
The countries that are targets of state building projects are typically weak and failed 
states (Fukuyama 2004; Rotberg 2010). According to Rotberg, former President of the World 
Peace Foundation and professor at Harvard, strong states are differentiated from weak states by 
their ability to deliver “the most crucial political goods” (Rotberg 2010: 2). Rotberg explains that 
the most critical political good a state could supply is human security in order to prevent 
domestic threats, invasions or any other related dangers. Without human security, a state cannot 
supply other political goods like infrastructure, freedoms, schools and education, healthcare, or a 
money and banking system. This framework leads to the understanding that strong states are 
those that control their territory and provide plenty of political goods to their citizens, while 
weak states struggle to provide political goods whether that be through the inability to secure 
borders, corruption in the government or other failures. Failed states are differentiated from weak 
states in cases where the leadership is unable to exert its influence on its territory, violence is 




States can fail in various ways, and their differing failures can lead to different 
approaches in state-building. In the cases to be examined in depth later, both Japan and Bosnia 
became failed states because of the physically and socially destructive nature of their conflicts.  
Scholarship Perspectives on State-Building 
There are two groups of scholars focused on state-building. The first group focuses on the 
legitimacy of both the interventions and products of state-building. They seek to reckon with 
neo-imperialism and the consequences of sovereign nations meddling in other sovereign nations’ 
matters (Andersen 2012; Paris 2004). The second group looks to analyze the empirical nature of 
the happenings on the ground during state-building missions, like the faults and the successes 
within the state-building projects themselves (Dobbins 2003; Miller n.d.). These groups are not 
clearly in conversation with the other, but rather seem to be talking past each other. The 
empirical group does not question the legitimacy of state building projects, while the legitimacy 
group focuses on principles of intervention and rarely acknowledges empirical cases beyond 
their ideological failures. With this project, I seek to bridge a gap between the two groups of 
scholarship, and reckon with the legitimacy of state-building, especially with aspects like 
internationalized constitutions, and also understand the empirical facts that either led or did not 
lead to local ownership and a strong state. I address the effectiveness of internalized constitutions 
and the constitution making process, and the outcomes of the constitution-making process to 
better understand if and how legitimacy was created.  
Synonyms for State Building 
The United States has committed a variety of resources to the external building up of 




building a state. The main differences between the terms stem from the intentions of the project 
of state building, despite the fact the actions undertaken were quite similar, with efforts like 
institution building, constitution writing, election facilitation, market liberalization and 
infrastructure building. For example, the German and Japanese operations following World War 
II were described as “occupations,” because of the occupying force that remained in the country 
until the target countries were rebuilt in a favorable way to the occupying powers.  After the Cold 
War, the early projects in the 1990s were known as “peacekeeping,” “peace building,” or “peace 
enforcement” missions. Peacekeeping tends to encompass stabilizing a region through securing 
non-violence with the intention to leave the country as soon as possible. Recent interventions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have been labeled “stabilization” and “reconstruction” projects (Dobbins 
2003). While terms differ throughout eras, the goal of constructing a state via foreign 
intervention has largely remained the same and encompassed similar tactics.  
Scholarship on state building began in the 1990s, but was usually viewed through the 
perspective of peacekeeping. Not until the early 2000s was the process entitled “state-building” 
(Miller n.d.). Often times the term “nation-building” is used as a synonym for state building. 
Nation-building can be differentiated as building a homogenous group of people that identify as 
a specific nation group. State-building is focused on the institutions of governance in a territory, 
rather than building a community of people sharing history, customs and often language 
(Chesterman 2004). In some cases, the terms “peace-building,” “nation-building,” and “state-
building” are used interchangeably. In this piece, I will use the terms “peace-building” and 
“state-building” distinctly, with peace-building focusing on establishing security and eliminating 
root causes of conflict, while state-building focuses on (re)building institutions and governance 




peace-building converge with the goals of state building. The new Constitutions in both the case 
of Japan and Bosnia had goals to establish peace and build a new state, demonstrating the 
overlap in projects. Even though the taxonomy for state-building and peace-building was 
invented far after the Occupation in Japan, I will be referring to the project as state-building 
throughout this work.  
III. Constitutions 
In this section, I seek to explore the historical importance of constitutions, their various uses 
and purposes, and the occasions that constitutions were written in post-conflict environments by 
the international community. 
The Basics of Constitutions 
To understand the importance of constitutions, we must first understand the function of 
constitutions. To most a constitution is a formal written document containing the basis for a legal 
structure. Yet, the term “constitution,” as used by the Greeks was meant to literally describe how 
and what something was made up of, how it was “constituted” (Zuckert and Valenzuela 2011: 
72). Rather than exclusively outlining processes of law and justice, constitutions define 
institutional structure, and set up the structures through which power can flow: “Constitutions 
should limit and channel power and at the same time should somehow permit and foster those 
actions to achieve the common good” (Zuckert and Valenzuela 2011: 75). A similar analogy 
compares a constitution to instructions. Like the instructions that accompany a toy in need of 
assembly, a constitution is the instructions for how to assemble a government (Alexander 2011: 




Constitutions and the constitution making process can accomplish a multitude of goals. 
Constitutions can serve as a mechanism to create a shared vision of the future of the state and a 
path to get there. Constitutions can be peace agreements and frameworks for setting up new 
democracies. Constitutions can seek to transform a society from violence to peace, and create a 
new way to manage conflict through the structuring of power, resources and justice systems 
(Samuels 2006). 
Post-Conflict, Internationalized Constitutions 
If we understand constitutions as a set of principles to instruct the governance structure of 
the state, internationalized constitutions do the same thing, but are created by and reflect the 
views of international arbiters about governance structure, power allocation, legal issues and 
long term goals of a nation (Hay 2014). In this work I will refer to constitutions influenced by 
foreigners or the international community largely, as internationalized constitutions.  
Constitutions can be internationalized through their adoption of democratic and liberal 
principles. One example of how constitutions are internationalized is through the embedding of 
international law into local judicial systems and domestic law. In the constitutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Timor-Leste, provisions are outlined such that international law is 
stated as integral or superior to domestic law (Hay 2014: 143-145).  
Internationalized constitutions can pose a challenge to international norms like 
sovereignty and self-determination. Sovereignty, the authority of a state to govern itself, is 
violated when an outside force looks to impose its will on another state. In the example above, 
the incorporation of international law into a state’s constitution threatens the authority of the 




The international community acting as a stakeholder in constitution making processes 
poses issues for the future legitimacy and adoption of any constitution. Much of state building 
scholarship is concerned with ‘local ownership,’ which alludes to the ‘locals,’ people who live in 
a given state, participating and influencing the process of state building and structure of 
governance. Local ownership is important to internationalized constitutions because constitutions 
that are ‘owned,’ lead to the adoption of international principles that foreigners intended to 
impose. Without local ownership, outside principles usually do not last and tend to be replaced 
with principles from the period of conflict. Much of the question of local ownership from a state 
builder’s perspective focuses on how to create local ownership while still imposing international 
ideals on a population.  
The field of internalized constitutions has not yet been well researched or analyzed (Hay 
2014). For this reason, the connection between internationalized constitution-making and local 
ownership is important to explore.  
The Process of Constitution Making & Post-Conflict Constitution Making 
This section focuses on the process of constitution making, which can greatly affect the 
end product of the constitution and the extent it is accepted by the domestic population. 
Constitution making encompasses the formation of ideas behind the constitution, the actors 
involved with the constitution making process and the writing of the constitution. Constitution 
making in post-conflict environments is often the starting point towards peace, stability and a 
shared society (Hart 2001). Since 1974, more than 170 countries have looked to adopt or rework 
their constitution, which is often sparked by some form of armed conflict (Benomar 2004; Hart 




constitutions can be used as peace documents as well. Constitution-making is not a thing of the 
past, but is a core necessity for any state-building mission (Samuels 2006). As noted by Dr. 
Kristi Samuels, the lead legal consultant to the United Nations Development Program on the 
constitution-building process for Somalia, “the design of a constitution and constitution making 
process is an integral part of the political and governance transition in [state]-building” (Samuels 
2006: 664).  
Scholars focusing on the process of constitution making, especially in post-conflict states, 
have found that constitution making itself greatly affects the state at hand, and that constitution 
processes and results are “often so interrelated as to be inseparable” (Hay 2014: 144; Samuels 
2006). Scholars found that more inclusive constitution making processes led to constitutions 
including greater political equity, human rights protections and social justice provisions than 
constitutions made solely by elites or without all groups involved in the conflict (Benomar 2004; 
Hart 2001; Samuels 2006). Additionally, things like transparency in the constitution making 
process and calls for public participation only increased the legitimacy of the final product 
(Benomar 2004; Hart 2001).  
A form of ‘new constitutionalism,’ in post-conflict environments, focuses on constitution 
making as a conversation and a process that centers groups, individuals, identities and rights. 
Rather than ‘old constitutionalism,’ that focuses on constitutions as documents that define power 
and citizenship (Hart 2001).  
A perfectly written document cannot single-handedly be used to fix a society. Weak and 
fragile states are not blank slates on which to build a new democratic system of governance, but 




constitutionalism represents a stagnant unchanging way of thinking about the constitution as an 
event or a box to check, whereas new constitutionalism invites a process and many parties at the 
table. All in all, the process of constitution making clearly affects the design and end product that 
becomes a state’s constitution. 
IV. Local Ownership 
Local ownership refers to the extent to which domestic actors are involved in both the 
implementation and the design of political processes (Donais 2009):3). The inclusion of ‘locals’ 
promotes the acceptance of the state building project, and the likelihood that institutions built by 
the locals will remain after international actors leave (Perry and Keil 2016). Local ownership is 
important because without the domestic acceptance of the structures of the state-building 
projects, they are likely to fail (Donais 2009). 
The issue of local ownership will always be prevalent in balancing the relationship between 
foreign and domestic actors in state-building exercises. There will always have to be decisions 
made about the allocations of power between foreigners and locals while foreigners remain in-
country. Confronting how to handle local ownership can be postponed, but it cannot be 
eliminated (Donais 2009). 
Perry and Keil make the differentiation between two types of ownership: functional 
ownership and structural ownership. Functional ownership includes the involvement of local 
actors in the implementation of projects, while structural ownership involves domestic actors 
participating in the structuring and design of long-term strategies, policy priorities and initiatives 
for achieving long-term goals (Perry and Keil 2016). In the long run, both functional and 




between functional and structural ownership can be seen with elections. Functional ownership 
can be seen when domestic actors participate in elections, especially in cases where the elections 
are put together by the international community (IC), while structural ownership can be seen 
when domestic actors plan and coordinate elections. After the IC leaves, the expectation is for 
domestic actors to ‘own’ all parts of the election example, and all parts of the governance 
structure of the state broadly.  
The concepts of functional and structural ownership can be used strategically during state-
building. If the international community adopts a functional ownership first policy, the IC will 
seek to get domestic actors to participate in the building process quickly through things like the 
aforementioned elections or building up and participating in public services. Focusing on 
functional ownership first is associated with the logic that involvement and familiarity with new 
externally imposed processes will lead to higher level involvement gradually. If the international 
community focuses on structural ownership instead, the IC will seek to place domestic actors in 
powerful roles for them to contribute to the planning and design of the new and improved state. 
By focusing on structural ownership, the IC tends to build and secure a functioning state 
structure, and then place domestic actors in high level roles to be able to partake in design and 
planning of the state.  
The idea of focusing on functional or structural ownership correlates to the idea that the IC 
either treats local ownership as a policy, or treats local ownership as a goal in and of itself 
(Joseph 2007; Knaus and Martin 2003). Treating local ownership like a policy leads to an 
emphasis on including domestic actors in most projects, while treating local ownership as a goal 




policy fits with functional ownership, as they both emphasize the involvement of domestic actors 
throughout the state-building implementation process. While local ownership as a goal can be 
associated with structural ownership, for structural ownership is focused on the inclusion of 
domestic actors in the design, planning and management of the state-building project, and is less 
concerned with the involvement of domestic actors immediately and on lower levels of 
implementation. To summarize, there are two approaches to state-building that I will consider: 
(1) functional ownership with local ownership as a policy, and (2) structural ownership with 
local ownership as an end goal (Joseph 2007; Knaus and Martin 2003; Perry and Keil 2016).  
There is a connection between local ownership and state sovereignty. During state-building 
interventions the power that comes from domestic leadership is stifled to build a state. The end 
goal is to deliver a functioning state to the local people; but without the locals being in control of 
the planning or operation of the state-building project, the intervention can violate a state’s 
sovereignty. The conflict that precedes a state-building intervention is the catalyst for 
intervention and loss of sovereignty, but the real issue of state-building centers on when, and 
how to restore sovereignty. While most interventions that took place in the 1990s were approved 
and supported by the UN, the concept of state-building itself contradicts the ideals of sovereignty 
and self-determination put forth by the UN. Yet, this contradiction is allowed in the UN Charter 
because of the security threats created by conflicts. To maintain local ownership, is to be 
operating a sovereign state.  
Problems with local ownership 
There are three impediments that often prevent state builders from granting local ownership: 




The concept of local ownership is often conflated with the ideas of good governance. From 
the good governance perspective, the responsibility of the target state is to take ownership of the 
predetermined set of policies created by international interveners and operate them well (Donais 
2009:6). In this conflation, the international community views its role as reshaping a failed state 
into a functioning one, then gifting the functioning state structure to the local people. The people 
are then responsible for operating the gifted state without having had any say in its creation. 
Gifting a state without input is distinctly opposite from local ownership, by some standards 
‘gifting’ actually disempowers locals by expecting them to blindly accept what is imposed from 
above.  
The issue of “internationals-know-best” can be broken down into two assumptions: (1) 
international interveners believe their solutions are the best solutions, and (2) the local 
population would have been unable to solve their problems without intervention. Because liberal 
state-building programs originated in the 1990s, they often have a technocratic flavor such that 
technical knowledge about the liberal democratic state takes precedence over local knowledge. 
In this technocratic view, the perspectives of locals are viewed more as obstacles to overcome 
than as helpful input for designing a sustainable state (Donais 2009). Additionally, what Hughes 
and Pupavac call pathologization occurs, which frames locals as incompetent and backwards, 
therefore shifting the responsibility to so-called international experts to heal the wounds of a 
broken state (Donais 2009; Hughes and Pupavac 2005). Under these conditions, local ownership 
is allocated carefully and at the will of the responsible interveners. This benefactor-recipient 
relationship harkens back to colonialism and the white man’s burden, where locals are supposed 




 The last impediment is timing, with the formulation of state-building documents, plans 
and exit strategies. First, state-building documents are often forged quickly in order to stop 
violence as soon as possible, leading to an inability to negotiate with the local population and the 
creation of hard-to-alter principles, goals and strategies of the state-building project. The 
problem with exit strategies starts with the inability for international interveners to make their 
exit date flexible. Most state-building missions are focused on completing projects, and often 
their funding is dependent on progress. Temporary state-building missions push interveners to 
try and work as quickly as possible, setting short timelines and looking for tangible numerical 
results, perhaps at the cost of creating long lasting institutions and structures (Donais 2009). 
Assumptions of Local Ownership 
In order for reforms from state-building to take hold, they must be adopted by the locals. But 
the issue with the concept of the ‘locals’ is that the locals are imagined as one homogenous 
group with the same wants and needs. Yet, there is rarely one singular body in which all 
members seek the same societal outcomes, especially in post-conflict situations (Donais 2009). 
Some groups may not have the capacity or, simply, the will to reform the state. The project of 
state building relies on the idea that local actors want to build a peaceful state, but there is a 
potential that some do not want a peaceful state or envision a state differently than the way state-
builders do (Donais 2009; Joseph 2007). 
Additionally, state-building relies on the transmission of norms from one system to another, 
yet these outside norms are not always easily accepted especially when they contradict with 
domestic norms. The challenge of transmitting norms often appears when training security forces 




groups within society. To accomplish learning international principles, internationals often must 
disassemble the structure that exists in the state in order to rebuild it in a way that functions 
according to Western values (Donais 2009; Joseph 2007). International norms are not easily 
absorbed into a system without this rebuilding, which is at the heart of state-building missions.  
Lastly, problems arise in timing with handing over local ownership too early and too late. If 
too much power is given up too early, there is a risk that dangerous structures of hate and 
violence can be legitimized by the state’s structure. If local ownership is handed over too late, 
there is a risk of a state growing dependent on the international community and its interventions. 
The formula for state-building has not been completely solved, as the record of post-Cold War 
state-building endeavors shows that more than half of the projects collapse within the first five 
years (Donais 2009).  
V. Conclusion 
This chapter has set up the analytical framework through which I will compare my two cases 
of post-conflict state-building. I use the scholarship on constitution-making and local ownership 
to assess the cases of Japan and Bosnia. My goal is to prove that democratic constitution-making 
processes best balance the imposition of values from internationals with the values of domestic 
actors. In addition, democratic constitution-making reflects the use of state-building strategies 
that focus on local ownership as an end goal, rather than a policy, which leads to inclusion of 
domestic actors in the design of political structures and successive state-building outcomes in the 
long-term.  
In the next chapter, I will provide a historical overview of my cases. After, I will then 




cases, followed by the evidence or lack thereof of functional and structural local ownership in 




















Chapter Three:  
Historical Background  
 
In this chapter, I discuss the historical background of my cases, in order to provide the 
context for their state building projects. I start with the pre-war context of each country, then 
describe the conflict and the stakes of the conflict.  I briefly include how the conflicts ended. In 
both of the cases, the end of the conflicts fed directly into the constitution-making process.  
I. Japan 
Pre-war Context 
To many Americans, the pervasive narrative concerning Japan during World War II came 
from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East that summarized Japan’s militancy 
during World War II as Japan seeking Far East domination, launching campaigns of aggression 
in order to meet its goals. To a Western audience, World War II has largely been reduced to a 
dual over good and evil: the Allies -- the U.S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union -- were said to 
stand for peace and democracy, while the Axis -- Germany, Italy and Japan -- were said to 
support aggression and chaos (Hama 2017).  
In Japan, World War II is often referred to as the “Greater East Asian War.” To many 
Japanese the prewar build up and war itself are viewed in a completely different way than the 
Western view suggests. Beginning in the 19th century, Japan had observed as China was overrun 
by European and Russian forces, and in self-defense and admiration, Japan began to emulate the 
West in empire-building. Social and political institutions were modernized to fit into the Western 
paradigm, and Japan transferred from an agrarian economy to a manufacturing and export-based 




country in the world due to the emphasis on education, savings, technological borrowing and 
market exchange rates (Nafziger 1995). With this economic and technological growth came a 
rising standard of living and almost doubling of the population (Hama 2017: 49). 
On the heels of Japan’s victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and 
demonstrated strength in the Russo-Japanese War (1904 -1905), U.S. President Theodore 
Roosevelt was recorded multiple times supporting a sort of “Japanese Monroe Doctrine,” which 
entailed Japan creating its own spheres of influence throughout East Asia. Pre-war Japan was 
focused on the idea that international cooperation with the West would lead to fair treatment as 
an equal in foreign policy (Hama 2017).  
Japan’s expansionism stemmed from two economic and political goals: Japan needed a 
place for its ballooning population to work and Japan wanted to be seen as independent and 
equal among other world powers. In the 1920s, Japan pursued peaceful expansionism to extend 
its influence throughout East Asia, but it largely failed. For that reason, in the 1930s, Japan 
employed militaristic expansionism in order to fulfill its earlier stated goals. Japan invaded 
Manchuria in 1931, and by 1938 most of China was under the occupation of the Japanese. At the 
height of Japanese expansionism, the Japanese empire extended into mainland China, Korea, 
Southeast Asia and the archipelagos lying between mainland Japan and Australia (Streissguth 
2003). 
Supreme Commander of Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur noted that Japan’s 
surging population, booming manufacturing industry and lack of indigenous raw materials was 
the main catalyst for Japanese expansionism, and this expansionism is ultimately what drew 




World War II 
After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Japan’s ongoing war with China, tensions 
between Japan and the United States grew. Domestically, the Japanese Government began 
adopting repressive policies like limiting freedom of speech and controlling the media in order to 
heighten support for the war in China. The Japanese education system bred patriotism for war 
efforts through introducing curriculum focused on worshipping the Emperor and militarism. 
Shintoism became representative of Japan, and was used similarly to education to breed 
patriotism and nationalism in the citizenry of Japan. When passing the Imperial Palace, the home 
of the Emperor, or Shinto shrines, citizens were expected to bow (Ienaga 1978). 
The Japanese military looked to conquer the Netherlands East Indies as a resource hub, 
but this encroachment crossed the line in the eyes of the Americans, British, Dutch and Chinese.  
In July 1941, these countries formed the ABCD group, and blocked Japan through freezing 
assets. The U.S. also imposed an oil embargo on Japan. Japan would not be able to continue the 
war in China without oil and other raw materials that were blocked by the ABCD group (Ienaga 
1978). Not wanting to lose their advances into China, Japan doubled down, the Japanese military 
planned to attack in early December if they could not come to a compromise with the U.S. In 
negotiations, the U.S. demanded unconditional withdrawal from China and French Indochina, 
which was unacceptable to the Japanese after years of military sacrifices. With that failure to 
compromise, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and the Malay Peninsula to begin the war against the 
U.S. and England (Ienaga 1978). 
Japan was repeatedly beat on land and sea throughout 1942 through the eventual end of 




and through a series of further island battles, the U.S. forces quickly moved within easy striking 
range of Japan. In March 1945, air raids were conducted over Tokyo and smaller cities like 
Nagoya, Osaka, Yokohama and Kobe. By April, American forces landed in Okinawa, a Southern 
island in Japan. On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and three days 
later a second was dropped on Nagasaki. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 
and began attacking in Manchuria and Northern Korea. Japan was facing the wrath of the allies 
from all fronts.  
The leadership of the military is largely to blame for the overzealous attacks on both the 
U.S. and England at once (Hama 2017; Ienaga 1978; Schaller 1987). One analysis explains that 
the education system and repressive internal security laws made it so the Japanese could not 
accurately perceive the realities of the conflict. Japanese deaths from July 1937 through August 
1945 from combat totaled 2.3 million, which does not include the losses of civilians or missing 
persons (Ienaga 1978). 
End of World War II 
 The Emperor declared surrender on August 15, 1945.  It was clear to all, except the 
military, that Japan was not going to emerge from the war as the victor. The military advocated 
for a final stand, when and if the Allies arrived on the shores of the mainland of Japan (Ienaga 
1978). Although the Emperor was the commander of the military, the emboldened military 
leadership rebuked the idea of surrender. A group of army officers even planned a coup in hopes 
of seizing power and establishing a military government to continue the war. The coup failed. 




‘surrender,’ the government often used the phrases ‘acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration’ or 
the ‘end of the war’ (Ienaga 1978: 233). 
In accordance with the Potsdam Declaration that outlined the terms for surrender, 
American occupation forces entered Japan under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, 
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). SCAP was in charge of the 
demilitarization and democratization of Japan.  
II. Bosnia 
Pre-War Context 
 The Bosnian conflict was the direct result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia had its origins in the historical identities of the communities residing 
within Bosnia (Berg and Shoup 1999). Bosnia contained three distinct communities: the 
Bosniaks (once referred to as Muslims), the Serbs and the Croats. The three communities share a 
common language and lifestyle. Yet, each community had loyalties to religions, nationalities or 
ethnicities rather than have formed one cohesive multicultural people. Although Bosnia has been 
the home of three different communities for centuries, historically there were not many 
ethnically motivated conflicts before World War II (Berg and Shoup 1999). Shared history 
brought these communities together, but a shared identity was never forged (Andjelic and 
Andjelic 2003; Berg and Shoup 1999).  
 During World War II, the Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia in April 1941, and 
established the Independent State of Croatia, a puppet state which included the territory of 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and some of Serbia and Slovenia. It was ruled by the fascist Ustasa, 




between 320,000 and 340,000 ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC n.d.). This genocide left a permanent scar on the 
relations between Serb and Croat communities.  
 The Communist party reestablished Yugoslavia after liberating the country from German 
rule, under the motto “brotherhood and unity”.  With the employment of federation and soft-
communism, Yugoslavia and Bosnia within prospered (Andjelic and Andjelic 2003). Yugoslavia 
was made up of six republics, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Macedonia, and two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo. In the beginning of 
Communist rule, Yugoslavia was a highly centralized communist country ruled by President for 
life Josip Broz Tito.  
 The 1974 Constitution in Yugoslavia formalized the process of decentralization that 
began around the mid-1960s. The greatest change was the new definition of the republics and 
provinces as equal federal units of the country of Yugoslavia. Each federal unit became an 
independent agent, although constrained by Tito. The 1974 Constitution made the way for the 
federal unites to practice operating independently. Tito as President for life was written in the 
Constitution as the commander of the military, but there was no direction after his death except 
to generally operate Yugoslavia via consensus (Meier and Ramet 1999).  
 Throughout the late 1980s, Milosevic and the Serbia leadership politically conquered 
both autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and also Montenegro, which meant that 
Milosevic was expanding Serbian influence for a ‘Greater Serbia.’ The army leadership 




 Slovenia, concerned with the power Serbia was gaining, and fed up with the unequal 
financial burdens on the republic pushed for Yugoslavia to become a confederation and grant 
individual federal units greater sovereignty. Croatia and Slovenia both began planning free, 
multiparty elections for April 1990. The other federal units within Yugoslavia had an issue with 
the elections because they allowed for political pluralism, which was against the standing 
Constitution (Meier and Ramet 1999).  
 In mid-May 1990, riots began in Croatia, largely incited by Milosevic’s provocations 
through emphasizing how difficult it was to live in Croatia as a Serb. In August, armed civilians 
in the Croatian city of Knin set up blockades in the roads, their weapons coming from the Serb 
local police. Minority enclaves of Serbs later began emulating these actions across Bosnia. The 
historic mythology that wherever Serbs lived was Serbia advanced these provocations (Meier 
and Ramet 1999). The violence in Croatia and Serb enclaves were some of the first acts of 
violence that would lead to war.  
Slovenia and Croatia declared formal independence on June 25, 1991. Briefly, the 
Yugoslav Army intervened in Slovenia, but withdrew shortly after confirming Slovenia’s 
independence. Following Croatia’s independence announcement, Serb minority populations 
within Croatia declared their own independence from the republic and their desire to join Serbia. 
The Yugoslav army came to intervene to stop the violence, but it became clear they sided with 
the Serb population in Croatia (Meier and Ramet 1999). Bosnia-Herzegovina had a referendum 
on independence in March 1992, which was boycotted by the Serb community, but BiH still 




from Bosnia. The crumbling of the once united Yugoslavia, and competing independence claims 
are the catalysts for the war in Bosnia.  
The Bosnian War 
 The conflict in Bosnia took place between April 1992 and December 1995, and it was 
continuously stoked by hate propaganda and rumor-filled stories to create panic amongst all 
three communities. 
 The Serbian nationalist program managed by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic 
included the goal of territorial and ideological expansion. Militant Serbs evoked the historic and 
nationalist story that wherever Serbs lived was a part of Serbia, and therefore it was their 
obligation to attach Serbian-occupied land to the growing Serbian state (Ramet 2006). Milosevic 
specifically focused on crafting propaganda to fuel ideas of paranoia, conspiracy and negative 
historical memories in order to persuade Serb combatants into committing crimes against other 
ethnic groups. For example, the large number of lives lost during World War II at the hands of 
the Croatian Ustasa was invoked to drive a wedge between the Serb and Croat communties. 
Frequently, Milosevic emphasized that Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia were able to proclaim the 
right of self-determination, while stoking fears especially concerning the Bosniaks (Ramet 
2006). 
 Croatian nationalism led by President Franjo Tudjman was based around protecting the 
homeland of Croatia, and taking the flexible borders of Bosnia in the aftermath of the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia to grow Croatia. During the war years, most Croatian propaganda focused on 
villainizing the Serbs (Ramet 2006). Alijia Izetbegovic, the president of the Party of Democratic 




privileging one national group. Izetbegovic was also elected to the presidency of Bosnia in the 
multiparty elections that took place in 1990, and he was the President of the Presidency at that 
time, which made him the leader of Bosnia.  
 Immediately after the night of the Bosnian referendum for independence, March 1, 1992, 
nationalist Serbs built barricades around Sarajevo and other cities across Bosnia. Serbs began 
shelling the Sarajevo suburbs in early April. The Bosniaks were unprepared concerning the 
amount and availability of weapons. Around the same time in early April, the Serbs declared 
their own independence as the Serbian Republic or Republika Srpska within Bosnia. 
 Milosevic and Karadzic sent troops to expel non-Serb populations from parts of Bosnia 
that were to be a part of the Republika Srpska they were building, which was to be done through 
a combination of ethnic cleansing, terror and elimination of multiculturalism (Ramet 2006). 
Through instituting grotesque acts like eyeball gouging and sexual abuse, nationalist Serbs 
frightened citizens to flee their homes. Detention campus were also used to detain enemy 
combatants and civilians alike. Once in the camp the detainees were frequently violently beaten, 
humiliated and often killed. Serbs also targeted places that represented cosmopolitanism, like the 
National Library in Sarajevo, in order to show that multiculturalism and living together with 
others was simply impossible and that living in solely ethnic communities was the only 
sustainable way to live.  
 On December 17, 1992, the Bosnian Serb parliament issued a statement declaring that the 
war was over noting that the Serb nation had achieved its territorial objectives in Bosnia. The 
next month, January 1993, each community was approached with a peace plan, the Vance-Owen 




parties except the Serb leader Karadzic signed the plan. The Vance-Owen plan was followed by 
the Karadzic-Boban plan of June 1993, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan of August 1993, the EU 
Action Plan of December 1993 and the Contact Group Plan of July 1994. None of the plans were 
successful, although certain parts of some of them were included in the final Peace Agreement 
document, the Dayton Accords (Ramet 2006). 
 Perhaps one of the last straws for the West to get involved forcefully was the genocide in 
1995 at the UN-declared safe area of Srebrenica. The Serbs had dominated UN forces through 
shackling peacekeepers and violating UN no-fly zones. Beginning on June 15, the waters were 
tested by Serb nationalist General Mladic, as he shelled Srebrenica. UNPROFOR, the supposed 
peace keeping and protective force from the United Nations, did not respond, and Mladic began 
his assault on July 6. Mladic’s forces separated able-bodied men from women, children and the 
elderly to kill them. More than 7,000 men were killed over several days. The UN and NATO, in 
failing to provide meaningful backup or air strikes failed the people of Srebrenica (Ramet 2006). 
 On August 28, 1995, a mortar stuck Sarajevo’s central market leading to 37 causalities 
and wounding 80 or more. This came just after the loss of three high-ranking US diplomats 
involved in peace talks who had been on their way to Sarajevo. On August 30, NATO began 
bombing Serbian strongholds (Ramet 2006). 
According to the “Bosnian Book of the Dead” approximately 100,000 people died as a 
direct result of the fighting in the war in Bosnia (Balkan Insight 2013). Some 2.7 million people 
were displaced from their homes. Seventy percent of historical buildings, places of worship, 
cemeteries, libraries and archives had been destroyed since the early portion of the war. 




war, and it was estimated up to sixty per cent of the population struggled with post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Ramet 2006). All this to say the losses of this war were tremendous. 
The End of the War 
The Americans arranged for the peace talks to occur in Dayton, Ohio beginning on 
November 1, 1995 between Milosevic representing the Bosnian Serbs, Tudjman representing the 
Bosnian Croats, and Izetbegovic representing the Bosniaks. The three sides reached an 
agreement on November 21, 1995, and the war finally came to an end. The agreement was 
officially signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. This agreement, the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement or 
Dayton Accords outlined the tenets of the following peace and state building project as well as 
created a brand new Constitution for the people of Bosnia.  
III. Conclusion 
 This chapter provides a background of the pre-war contexts, war atrocities and end of war 
processes in order to set the stage to understand the meaningful aspects of both the state-building 
projects and Constitution-making processes in both cases. It is clear that the cases are very 
distinct in the challenges of both the pre-war context and the wars themselves, yet the reason 
these cases are comparable is because of the state-building projects that ensued after conflict 
ended and the inclusion of internationalized constitutions in both countries. Key to the analysis 
are the contextual issues of three-front ethno-nationalized groups fighting within Bosnia, and 






Chapter Four:  
Local Ownership in Constitution-Making  
 
In this chapter, I argue that iterative, democratic constitution-making processes during 
state-building lead to greater local ownership. In the first part of my analysis, I consider how the 
constitution-making processes differ between Japan and Bosnia. I touch on the differences 
between my cases in the way the conflicts ended, the actors involved, and how those 
characteristics affected the process of constitution-making and the content of the constitutions. 
The similarity that makes these cases comparable is the presence of internationalized 
constitutions in both cases, even though they were arrived at through different means. In Japan, 
the principles of the Constitution stemmed from the international community, but the 
constitution-making process was democratic and involved domestic actors, while in Bosnia that 
Constitution was written by the interveners in the Bosnian conflict as a part of the peace 
agreement.  
I. Nature of the Conflict 
Japan and Bosnia did not experience the same type of conflict, neither did their conflicts 
end in the same fashion. Japan was an actor in World War II, and the war ended by domination 
from the allies and the ultimate surrender of Japan. In Bosnia, a three-front civil conflict arose 
during the breakup of Yugoslavia that was ended by a peace agreement forged by the 
international community. These differences affected the strategies of state-building, and the 
principles that would be included in the war-ending documents, and later included in the final 





Japan’s War-Ending Document: the Potsdam Declaration 
In direct response to the nature of World War II, the Potsdam Declaration outlined six 
key tenets that Japan had to meet after its surrender. To prevent future conflicts originating from 
Japan, the Allies sought to install a democratic governance system. The tenets from the Potsdam 
Declaration are summarized as follows: 1) Japan had to eliminate militaristic persons that drove 
war efforts; 2) Japan had to be occupied until war-making power was destroyed and Japan met 
the Allies’ terms; 3) The Japanese government had to remove obstacles to democracy and 
strengthen democratic tendencies among Japanese people; 4) Japan could not retain war-making 
industries; 5) The allies had to leave Japan after these objectives were accomplished and a new 
government was established based upon the “freely expressed will of the Japanese people;” 6) 
Japan was required to surrender and agree to these principles, or otherwise it would be destroyed 
by the Allies (Potsdam Declaration Annex II, art.3, July 26, 1945). 
The Potsdam Declaration was signed on July 26, 1945, but it did not immediately end 
World War II. Fighting still continued through the next month until the Emperor made a radio 
broadcast on August 15, 1945, announcing the plan to surrender. On September 2, 1945, a formal 
surrender document was signed on the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay. When the 
surrender was made official, the Emperor also agreed to the terms of surrender based in the 
Potsdam Declaration. 
Bosnia’s War-Ending Document: the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also referred 




building projects in Bosnia, and it was much more ambitious than Potsdam. It was intended to 
end the war like Potsdam, and also included extensive military provisions, a new Bosnian 
Constitution and principles for handling civilian peace implementation measures. Essentially, the 
Dayton agreement played the role of a peace treaty, a new constitution and a planning document 
for dividing responsibilities among international actors, all in one.  
The parties involved in the signing of the Dayton Accords agreed to (1) settle issues 
diplomatically; (2) welcome the military aspects of the peace settlement and regional 
stabilization plan; (3) accept the boundary demarcation between two entities; 1 (4) endorse the 
election plan; (5) welcome the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and respect and fulfill the 
commitments within that document; (6) welcome the arrangements of various commissions to 
protect human rights, refugees and displaced persons and preserve national monuments ; (7) 
recognize that the observance of human rights and protection of refugees is vital for peace; (8) 
agree to the civilian implementation process; (9) cooperate with all entities involved in this peace 
settlement; (10) recognize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as sovereign independent states (The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, art. 1-11, November 21, 1995). 2 
 
 
                                                          
 
1 The two entities that came into existence with the Dayton Agreement are the (1) Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and (2) the Republika Srpska.  
2 The parties involved with signing the Dayton Accords included the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan 
Milosevic (who was representing Bosnian Serb interests), President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman (who was 





Comparing Potsdam and Dayton 
In table 1, the Potsdam Declaration and the Dayton Agreement are compared as war-
ending documents in terms of the similar purpose they served between cases.  
Table 1: Comparing War-Ending Documents 
 
The nature of the conflict determined the provisions that had to be accounted for in the 
war-ending documents. In the case of Japan, the Allied military victory left the country few other 
options but to agree to the terms presented in Potsdam. Whereas, in the case of Bosnia, the 
Dayton Agreement had to do more than simply end the violence, it sought to ensure lasting 
peace. The collapse of Yugoslavia followed by the Bosnian war left Bosnia as a failed state. 
Without rebuilding a functioning state, the consensus of the West was that Bosnia was doomed 
to resume fighting since a power vacuum existed (Paris 2004). The Dayton Accords was an 
attempt to promote peace through both military measures and civilian implementation including 
democratization.  




Acceptance/Signing of document led to the end of 
the conflict 
✔ ✔ 
Outlined tenets of state building project ✔ ✔ 
Included instructions for military occupation  ✔ 
Included new Constitution  ✔ 




II. Actors Involved 
In Japan and Bosnia, the number of actors involved and the type of actors themselves 
differed. The occupation in Japan can be considered primarily a unilateral military intervention, 
while the state-building project in Bosnia was multilateral military and civilian from its 
inception.  
Japan 
The main actor in the occupation of Japan was the Office of Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (SCAP). The role of Supreme Commander was designated for General Douglas 
MacArthur. The SCAP had complete authority over the Emperor and government of Japan, 
pursuant of the Potsdam Declaration, which specifically outlined SCAP’s powers as follows:  
From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese 
Government to rule the state will be subject to you and you will take such steps as you 
deem proper to effectuate the surrender terms. You will exercise supreme command over 
all land, sea and air forces which may be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the 
surrender terms by the Allied Forces concerned ((1) Rad W 48672 (TS), WARCOS to 
CINCAFPAC, 13 Aug 45. In C/S GHQ SWPA, WD 1119 (S)). 
 
 Though MacArthur was given Supreme authority over Japan, the Allies also encouraged 
MacArthur to use the existing power structures of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese 
Government to accomplish the terms of surrender from the Potsdam Declaration.  
 Beyond the leading role of the SCAP, there were three advisory bodies: the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Far East Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. The U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff oversaw General MacArthur and was responsible for the initial document, “Basic 
Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper,” concerning the policies for 




responsible for the high level policy decisions concerning the occupation from the viewpoint of 
the Allies. The Allied Council was an advisory body located in Tokyo with only four members, 
which included the SCAP as the chairman and representatives from the U.S., Soviet Union and 
China, and one single member representing the U.K., Australia, New Zealand and India.  Policies 
were adopted by the FEC, transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the SCAP, who would 
issue the necessary orders to the Japanese government and occupation forces. The Allied Council 
was often consulted concerning execution of policy decisions (Reports of General MacArthur, 
MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Volume I Supplement n.d.). 
  
Figure 1: Command Structure of 
American military forces during 
the Occupation of Japan from 





The Allies were able to assert influence on the Occupation of Japan through the FEC and the 
Allied Council, which made the project not entirely unilateral. The hierarchal nature of the 
organization of the command structure helped streamline the process of state-building. All 
policies began with the FEC based on the fulfillment of the Potsdam Declaration and flowed 
downwards through the SCAP with ultimate implementation by staff sections.  
Bosnia 
In Bosnia, the state-building project was multilateral from its inception.  The Dayton 
Agreement included a number of tasks concerning peace-building, which later transitioned to 
state building exercises. 3  Tasks of peace-building were assigned to different international 
organizations for implementation. The Dayton Agreement extensively outlined strategies for the 
military and regional stabilization and also indicated civilian implementation measures but with 
far fewer details attached. The Dayton Agreement included many provisions, and they can be 
split into two pillars: peace & regional security and civilian implementation.  
 Peace and regional stability was handled by NATO, which led the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) starting with 60,000 NATO and other country troops, beginning in December 1995 (Berg 
and Shoup 1999). IFOR was in charge of enforcing the cease-fire, withdrawal and separation of 
forces, relocation of heavy weapons and demobilization of forces, and the safe withdrawal of UN 
                                                          
 
3 Peace building, defined as “effort to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to promote security of 
the individual, societal groups and the state, and to nurture features that create the conditions for 
a stable peace” (Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher 2014: 5) differs from state building, which is 
concerned with creating and strengthening state institutions. The Dayton agreement outlines 
peace-building exercises, which transitioned to state building exercises later. These projects 




forces. After the one year obligation of IFOR, as outlined by Dayton, it was replaced by the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was still coordinated by NATO. Both IFOR and SFOR were 
authorized by the Security Council, but without responsibility to the UN.  
The civilian implementation measures included a greater breadth of goals than the 
military implementation and included more organizations. The civilian implementation was 
coordinated by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which was created by the Dayton 
Agreement. The OHR is an ad hoc international institution, and its role is to oversee civilian 
implementation in Bosnia. The OHR is responsible to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), 
which was established after the signing of the Dayton Accords to monitor and assist in state 
building efforts until the principles of Dayton have been met. The OHR is staffed by 
internationals representing the interests of the PIC in support of peace and state building in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Steering Board of the PIC, who are the main directors, includes 
representatives from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Presidency of 
the EU, the European Commission and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The 
Steering Board was meant to meet monthly and assist in guiding peace implementation in Bosnia 
(Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held at Lancaster House, London, on 8 
and 9 December 1995). 
The creation of the OHR originated from the need to satisfy the European states. With the 
United States leading the military aspects of peace through NATO, European states wanted to be 
responsible for civilian implementation (Berg and Shoup 1999). The OHR was involved in many 




and internally displaced persons, implementation of the governance structure as put forth in the 
constitution and other logistics measures like creating common license plates, currency and 
symbols like the flag. The OHR also serves to coordinate international organizations and NGOs 
within the country.  
Figure 2 is a diagram of the peace- and state building operations in Bosnia. The two 
pillars of peace and regional security and civilian implementation can be seen at the top as the 
two largest blue boxes, all of the blue boxes represent facets of peace/state-building specifically 
mentioned in the Dayton Agreement. The small yellow boxes represent the international 
organizations involved in implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The green boxes represent 




in Figure 2, the international organizations often work individually, and do not have the 
organizational structure present to foster cooperation easily. 
Comparison between Actor Organization Structures 
It is clear that many more organizations are present in Bosnia than in Japan.  The Japan 
organizational structure is a hierarchy that functions from the top down, whereas the Bosnia 
organizational structure extends laterally to include many international organizations. The 
greatest difference stems from diffusion of executive authority beyond one organization in 
Bosnia, while in Japan all of the command structure ultimately falls under the SCAP. Between 
the organizational structures of the peace/state building projects, there are parallels between the 
offices and organizations. For example, the Government section from the Japan Occupation 
parallels with the role of the OHR to assist in the work of the central government. It is also not 
clear in the Bosnian peace building organization how the two pillars of security and civilian 
implementation are supposed to interact to fulfill the tenets of Dayton, and the separation 
between the military and civilian aspects generally made coordinated actions difficult (Belloni 
2007). The separation of the military and civilian components originates with a difference of 
opinions between the U.S. and European states. The U.S. handled the military aspects through 
NATO, and the Europeans were determined to manage the civilian implementation processes 
leading to a split in the peace/state building apparatus (Belloni 2007).  
Clearly, this comparison has shown that the Japan and Bosnia cases differ in both the 
number and types of actors involved in their state building processes. In Japan, there was a single 
organization running the state building project, the U.S. military through the Supreme 




charge of various aspects of the state building project with a distinct separation between military 
and civilian organizations.  
III. The Constitution Making Process 
Both of these factors, the war type and the actors involved, effect the constitution-making 
process significantly. The greatest differences between the constitution making-processes 
themselves in the cases of Japan and Bosnia were the timing of the process and the involvement 
of locals in the process. In Japan, the Constitution was made after the surrender of Japan, during 
the Occupation. Whereas in the Bosnian case the Constitution was made as part of the peace 
agreement to end the war. For Bosnia, the constitution existed when the peace/state-building 
exercises began. For Japan no modern constitution existed at the outset of the state building 
project, and one of the major directives included the involvement of the Japanese in the creation 
of government. In the case of Bosnia, the constitution-making process did not include local 
Bosnians.  
Japan 
In Japan, constitution making was an iterative process between SCAP and the existing 
Japanese leadership, and after the first election, the elected Japanese representatives. The 
Constitution making process in Japan was an example of prioritizing structural ownership, for 
domestic actors were involved in the design of the state. Immediately after the war, the Cabinet 
of Naruhiko Higashikuni operated the remaining system of governance and responded to the 
SCAP’s orders, yet the Higashikuni Cabinet had no intention to revise the Constitution. 




government had operated as Naruhiko Higashikuni himself was a Japanese Imperial Prince and a 
career officer in the Imperial Japanese Army.  
In response to the Higashikuni cabinet’s inability to move forward with the directives 
from SCAP, SCAP issued the Directive of Freedom on October 4, 1945, in which restrictions on 
political, civilian and religious freedoms had to be removed in order to guarantee freedom of 
thought, belief, assembly and speech. In addition, this directive led to the dismissal of 4,000 
people, and the Higashikuni Cabinet resigned the following day (戦争終結と憲法改正の始動 – 
“End of War and Start of Constitutional Amendment” 2021).  
The Shidehara Cabinet was then appointed to replace the Higashikuni Cabinet because of 
Kijuro Shidehara’s pro-American reputation, and passivism during his role as Foreign Minister. 
Shidehara was also connected to a powerful company or zaibatsu, Mitsubishi, through his wife, 
who was part of the Mitsubishi family.4 Shidehara was not royal like Higashikuni, but had served 
in a powerful role as the foreign minister previously, and clearly had connections to power 
through his marriage. Under the Shidehara Cabinet, a Constitutional Issues Investigation 
Committee was formed and the project of editing the Constitution began. The Constitutional 
Issues Investigation Committee was first established in order to research the prospect of 
constitutional amendment. The Committee included members of the Shidehara Cabinet and was 
focused at first on academic research, and then transitioned to the inclusion of directives from 
SCAP, ideas from parliament and public opinion.  The Committee produced a Constitutional 
                                                          
 
4 Zaibatsu refers to a large Japanese business conglomerate. Many zaibatsu supported war efforts, and during the 




reform outline, which summarized the aspects of the Constitution that needed to be corrected, 
that was submitted to SCAP on February 8, 1946 (戦争終結と憲法改正の始動 – “End of War 
and Start of Constitutional Amendment” 2021).  
After some back and forth with SCAP after the initial submission of the Constitutional 
reform outline, U.S. policy directives that were not included were added into the Constitution in 
Cabinet meetings on February 22 and 27, 1946. Two high ranking officials in the Legislation 
Bureau submitted the new draft on March 2, 1946, and then had participated in all-night 
negotiations with U.S. representatives concerning the Constitution that resulted in the final draft 
of the document on March 6, 1946 (戦争終結と憲法改正の始動 – “End of War and Start of 
Constitutional Amendment” 2021).  
The new draft of the Constitution had been published for the public to view. Every major 
party, except the Communists, approved of the new Constitution and it was even supported by 
the Emperor, Cabinet and Supreme Commander (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 
Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 164).  
The first election in occupied Japan was held in April 1946, and after the new legislature 
had been seated, and deliberation and edits occurred for about seven months, the Constitution 
passed in October 1946 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far 
East, Document 260). On May 3, 1947, the new post-war Japanese Constitution went into effect. 
The entirety of the constitution making process took about one and half years because of the 




from the Japanese Cabinet and legislature. General MacArthur summarized the constitution 
making process in his memoir: 
As can be seen, more than a year and a half had gone by since work on the new document 
had started, and during that whole long period it had been scrutinized by the people of 
Japan. I know of no similar important document that ever received so much attention and 
open debate, including our own Constitution (MacArthur 1964:301). 
Japan’s constitution-making process focused on structural ownership from the Japanese 
leadership by including Japanese leadership in the drafting and editing stages and then the 
elected representatives in the final edits. The Japanese constitution-making process demonstrates 
domestic actors being involved in the structuring and planning of state-building within Japan. 
The structural ownership that was established during this process would be fundamental to the 
ability of the domestic population to ‘own’ the state-building process. Perhaps without 
establishing structural ownership, Japan and the Japanese people could have felt more 
disillusioned with the state-building process and unwilling to adopt the new constitution or any 
following governance structure.  
While the principles of the Constitution were imposed from above, the interaction 
between Occupiers and domestic actors offered a kind of partnership that laid the groundwork 
for the rest of the state-building project.  
Bosnia 
As for the case of Bosnia, the constitution making process was part of the peace process. 
Therefore, the imposition of the Constitution employed functional ownership because the 
expectation of the IC was for the Bosnian domestic actors to comply with the tenets within the 




of State Richard Holbrooke was the lead mediator and U.S. negotiator because of his role in the 
region as the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs and his later role of 
U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans. There were three leaders in the negotiations each 
representing their own political ethno-nationalist group in the conflict: Slobodan Milosevic 
represented the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian interests, Franjo Tudjman represented Bosnian Croats 
and Croatian interests and Alija Izetbegovic represented the Government of Bosnia and the 
Bosniaks.5 Both Milosevic and Tudjman were leaders of external states, Serbia and Croatia 
respectively, but were representing their ethno-nationalist population within Bosnia in the peace 
negotiations.  Beyond the leaders, there were also representatives from the Contact Group, the 
EU and the OSCE present.6 Notably, there were no representatives from the UN (Greenberg, 
Barton, and McGuinness 2000). 
The negotiations were held on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, for a 
variety of reasons, including American leverage, high level secrecy and security and lack of 
media centers. Holbrooke emphasized that a United States-based negotiation would give himself 
and the American negotiators leverage to make a deal (Greenberg, Barton, and McGuinness 
2000). Additionally, the setting of an Air Force base emphasized the role of the military in the 
peace process. The secrecy and lack of media centers were to avoid Balkan leaders from 
appealing to the media to sway a deal.  
                                                          
 
5 Milosevic had to be granted permission to operate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs including mediation of the Serb 
Orthodox Patriarch.  
6 The Contact Group formed in response to the war in Bosnia and consisted of the United States, the United 




The negotiations took place from the 1st through the 21st of November 1995. One of the 
most complex and difficult issues to solve was that of territory and the map of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs had once gained control of about 75 percent of country, but in 
the territorial arrangement they would be awarded 49 percent of the country, with 51 percent 
going to the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. Tudjman and Izetbegovic struggled with the notion 
that the Bosnian Serbs were being rewarded areas that they had ethnically cleansed, rather than 
being punished for their violent acts. Upon agreeing to the map, Izetbegovic noted, “It is not a 
just peace, but my people need peace” (Greenberg, Barton, and McGuinness 2000:74). 
It is important to note the undemocratic origins of the Constitution. There was no 
opportunity for the constituent peoples of Bosnia to participate beyond the war-time leadership 
present. There was no ratification by the legislature necessary for the document to go into effect. 
Rather, the signatures of the leaders present represented the adoption of the new constitution 
(Yee 1996). The Dayton Agreement, the peace aspects and the Constitution would be imposed 
upon the entirety of the Bosnian population, without the say of many domestic leaders or the 
populace generally. There was no allocation of structural ownership to the Bosnians, especially 
considering that two of the leaders were from states external to Bosnia. Largely, the leadership 
involved with the crafting of the peace agreement and the Constitution would not be the ones 
having to live with the consequences.  
Clearly, the emphasis in this constitution-making process was less on the Constitution 
and more on securing peace in the region. The constitution-making process was largely 
completed by U.S. and international representatives to work comprehensively within the Dayton 




While both Japan and Bosnia have internationalized constitutions, the internationalization 
process is extremely different. In the case of Japan, there were standards that had to be met and 
adjustments made, but many decisions were handed over to the Japanese representatives 
themselves. In the case of Bosnia, the entire constitution was written as part of a peace 
agreement and then handed to the Bosnian people and imposed through NATO, the OHR, the 
OSCE and various other international organizations. The greatest difference can be summarized 
with the approaches to ownership, in the case of Japan, structural ownership was emphasized, 
while in the case of Bosnia, functional ownership was emphasized. In Japan, the IC allowed 
Japan to contribute to structuring its own society, while in Bosnia the IC expected Bosnians to 
operate within the structure that was created for them. Within the Japan state-building project 
there was great emphasis on Japanese built democracy, but in Bosnia the emphasis was on peace.  
IV. Constitutional Content 
This section highlights key details that make the Japanese and Bosnian constitutions both 
internationalized and unique to their own country. Both Constitutions included principles to 
create a democratic governance structure and protections for human rights, but they also include 
other principles unique to the war experience of the country and the actors involved. In the case 
of Japan, the distinctive parts of the Japanese Constitution include the role of the Emperor, the 
renunciation of war and the governance structure. In the case of Bosnia, the distinctive parts of 
the constitution are the two entities, internationally recognized human rights, right to return for 







After the preamble of the Japanese Constitution, the first chapter is specifically about the 
station of the Emperor. In the former Meiji Constitution of 1889, the Emperor is considered 
“sacred and inviolable,” as well as exercises the role as the head of the Empire. The Emperor had 
the ability to exercise legislative power with the consent of the Diet, issue Imperial ordinances in 
the place of law when the Diet was not in session, and command the military. Essentially, the 
Emperor was an all-powerful role given the powers of the Meiji Constitution. 
 In the new Constitution, the Emperor acted as a symbol of the state. The Emperor now 
required the advice and approval of the Cabinet for any acts he wished to take. Additionally, the 
powers of the Emperor are specifically outlined in the new Constitution, and the Emperor only 
performs acts specifically mentioned. Some of the acts included promulgation of amendments of 
the Constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties; convocation of the Diet; proclamation of 
general election of members of the Diet; receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers and 
performance of ceremonial functions. All of these acts had to be done with the advice and 
approval of the Cabinet, but all in all the role of the Emperor became highly ceremonial with 
power stemming from elected officials rather than from Emperor, as the Meiji Constitution had 
outlined the station of the Emperor.  
The second unique part of the Japanese Constitution was the renunciation of war. One of 
the key tenets of the Potsdam Declaration was the demilitarization of Japan, which was fulfilled 
through a War Clause in the new Japanese Constitution. The Constitution specifically stated,  
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 




In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized (日本国憲法 [Constitution]). 
Because of the militancy of Japan throughout the Second World War, the Allies wished 
to revoke war power from Japan. Additionally, the removal of power from the Emperor played 
into this tenet, for the Emperor was the commander of the military and therefore the leader that 
pushed on throughout the Second World War.  
Lastly, the new governance structure of Japan was outlined in the new Japanese 
Constitution. Japan became a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, made up of three branches: 
legislative, executive and judicial. The Emperor became the head of state, but had no 
governmental powers. The chief executive was the Prime Minister, who was selected by the Diet 
and then appointed to office by the Emperor. The rest of the Executive branch was made up of 
the Cabinet, which was composed of various ministers selected by the Prime Minister of Japan 
usually from the Diet.  
The legislative branch, the Diet, consisted of two houses.7 The upper house is called the 
House of Councilors, and the lower house is the House of Representatives. The members of the 
Diet are directly elected by the Japanese people. 
                                                          
 




In the Judicial branch, the highest court was the Supreme Court, and the other courts are 




Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) did not have any pre-war boundaries between ethnic groups 
within the country. The entities acknowledged in the Constitution have characteristics that make 
them close to states themselves, like the existence of separate administrations and individual 
constitutions, entity based armies, the responsibility to raise entity revenue to finance their own 
activities, and the ability to maintain special parallel relationships with neighboring states, like 
Croatia and Serbia (Belloni 2007; Caplan 2004). The recognition of the two entities legitimized 
the consequences of the war by dividing constituent peoples geographically (Yee 1996). The 
entities were separated by an Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), which divided the country 




along the 51-49 per cent proposal originating from previous peace negotiations before Dayton. 
BiH’s borders as a whole were preserved, but internally the country was divided among the 
political units where ethnic groups were predominant (Belloni 2007). 
While geographic separation was built into the Constitution of BiH, so was an emphasis 
on human rights. The Constitution of BiH included multiple points on human rights, specifically 
the necessity to adopt the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Within the provision for human rights, twenty plus international human 
rights instruments were built into the legal framework of the country, including human rights 
courts, ombudspersons and human rights monitoring missions (Belloni 2007). Because of the 
atrocities that occurred during the war, including the 1995 Srebrenica genocide, the international 
powers felt it necessary to provide international standards for human rights within the state 
Constitution. The inclusion of international law within a state Constitution begs the question 
about the true sovereignty of a state.  
The right for all refugees and displaced person to freely return to their pre-war homes 
functioned as a way to promote justice for those forced out of their prior homes during the 
conflict. The Constitution enumerated that refugees would have property restored to them that 
was taken after hostilities began in 1991 and be compensated for any property that could not be 
restored to them. The right to return was a distinct legacy of the war in Bosnia because of the 
number of people who fled their homes during the conflict.  
The governance structure outlined in the Constitution of BiH created an extremely weak 
central state, with more powerful entities. Within the entity constitutions, cantonal and municipal 




power on political communities in hope of power-sharing agreements between them (Chandler 
2000). Dayton created a complex structure with an abundance of power-sharing at the central 
state level, and self-governing abilities at the entity and lower level political territories. As noted 
by Belloni, “[the Dayton Agreement] created a complex political structure composed of one 
state, two entities, three peoples, four million citizens and five layers of governance led by 
fourteen prime ministers and governments, making Bosnia the state with the highest number of 
presidents, prime ministers and ministers in the entire world” (Belloni 2007:44).  
The Constitution enumerated a few powers to the central government, including foreign 
relations, inter-entity relations and control over the national economy. The new Constitution 
established a Parliamentary Assembly (Legislature), Collective Presidency and Council of 
Ministers (Executive) and Constitutional Court (Judiciary) (Yee 1996). Additionally, each entity 
also has its own executive, legislative and judicial branches. Any governmental powers not 
expressly allocated to central states institutions were granted to entity-level governments. The 
entities were the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was run by the Bosniaks and 
Bosnian Croats and the Republika Srpska that was run by the Bosnian Serbs. See figure four, for 





State-level Governance Structure 
Bosnia’s executive branch includes the Presidency and the Council of Ministers. The 
collective presidency consists of one Bosniak and one Croat member, each elected in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one Serb member elected from the RS. The 
Presidency is responsible for electing the Chair of the Council of Ministers, which will then be 
responsible for carrying out the policies and decisions of BiH. The Presidency has the power to 
conduct foreign policy, appoint ambassadors, represent BiH internationally, ratify treaties and 
execute decisions from the Parliamentary Assembly.  
Figure 3: Constitutional 




Bosnia’s legislature is a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly. The House of Peoples has 
fifteen members with quotas for five members from each ethnic group; five Croats and five 
Bosniaks, selected from the Federation, and five Bosnian Serbs chosen from the RS. Members of 
the House of Peoples are selected by the two entity-level legislatures. The House of 
Representatives has forty two members, which are divided by entity 28 representatives comes 
from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 14 come from the Republika Srpska. 
Members of the House of Representatives are elected directly through proportional 
representation from the two entities. The role of the Parliamentary Assembly is to enact 
legislation, approve budgets proposed from the Presidency for the operation of state institutions 
and ratify treaties (Yee 1996). An important power enumerated in the Constitution allows any 
ethnic group to declare legislation as “destructive of a vital interest,” essentially acting as a veto 
power if the majority of delegates from that ethnic group agree (Belloni 2007).  
Bosnia’s Constitutional Court is the highest court in the land, and it is made up of nine 
members.  Four members are appointed from the Federation (two Bosniaks and two Croats), two 
members appointed from the RS, and three members, who cannot be citizens of BiH or any 
neighboring state, are selected by the European Court of Human Rights. The Constitutional 
Court is in charge of handling disputes between the entities, between one entity and the central 
state, or between state institutions.  
The Bosnian Constitution is contradictory in how it seeks to reconcile a previously 
warring population through institutionalizing ethno-national divisions among the population, and 
at the same time preaching cooperation and power-sharing between the constituent peoples. The 




The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Federation is representative of the two constituent peoples who reside within the 
Federation.  The executive branch is headed by a Bosniak and Croat President and Vice 
President. The Federation Parliament includes two houses. The representatives in the House of 
Peoples are selected by Canton Assemblies, while the Federation House of Representatives is 
made up of 140 directly elected members (Chandler 2000). 
Within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina there are ten cantons. Five of the 
cantons have a Bosniak majority, three have a Bosnian Croat majority and the other two are 
ethnically mixed. Within each canton there is a government headed by a prime minister, who has 
a cabinet. There are also cantonal agencies, ministries and cantonal-specific services like 
education, police and courts.   
Cantons are made up of municipalities, which are the smallest administrative unit in the 
Bosnian political system. Within ethnically mixed cantons, municipalities become the main 
places of ethnic power. There are 79 municipalities grouped together across the ten cantons. 
Each municipality tends to consist of an urban area with surrounding villages, and each has a 
council and a municipality head.  
Republika Srprska (RS) 
The Republika Srpska has executive, legislative and judicial branches. The head of the 
executive branch is a single president with two vice presidents from different constituent 
peoples. The legislative branch is made up of the National Assembly and the Council of Peoples. 
The National Assembly has 83 directly elected deputies, and at least four members of one 




eight members from each of the constituent peoples and four from other groups; these members 
are elected by caucus in the National Assembly. Below the entity level government, the RS also 
has municipalities with their own with councils and a municipality head.  
The decentralization of Bosnia was supposed to protect the rights of constituent peoples 
and encourage power-sharing and cooperation because of the safety that was present locally. Yet, 
in reality the divisions that exist throughout Bosnia institutionalize divisions through the ethnic 
principles of state organization.  
  
The Constitution of Bosnia is clearly internationalized in ways that the Japanese 
Constitution is not. In a side to side comparison of the content of the Bosnian and Japanese 
Constitutions, there are many structural similarities, but there also specific differences. Both are 
Characteristics from Constitutions Japan Bosnia 
Based on the will of the people  ✔  
Internationalized Constitution ✔ ✔ 
Parliamentary System ✔ ✔ 
Bicameral Legislature ✔ ✔ 
Three Branches of Government ✔ ✔ 
Representative Democracy ✔ ✔ 
Constitutional Monarchy ✔  
Federal Republic  ✔ 
Weak Central State  ✔ 




democracies, and maintain parliamentary systems with bicameral legislatures. Yet, Japan is a 
Constitutional Monarchy and Bosnia is a Federal Republic. Japan’s constitution outlines the 
ceremonial role of an Emperor and relinquishes powers of war. Bosnia’s constitution includes 
international intervention through the OHR, Constitutional Court and International Law.  
V. Conclusion 
The post-conflict constitution-making process was greatly influenced by the context of 
the conflict for each country and the actors involved in the constitution-making process. The 
final constitutions of both Japan and Bosnia were highly internationalized due to the 
international involvement in their constitution making process.  
The constitution-making processes put a spotlight on how state-builders viewed 
functional and structural ownership. By including Japanese domestic actors in the planning and 
structural project of constitution-making there was clear evidence of an emphasis placed on 
structural ownership. Local ownership stemmed from the Potsdam Declaration that emphasized 
the government structure coming from the will of the people. 
 In Bosnia, the main goal was to end the war, and the Constitution was a means of 
keeping the peace after war-time and getting the parties to agree to the peace. For that reason, 
international interveners imposed the Bosnian Constitution without the input of the population in 
any form, and emphasized functional ownership such that domestic actors would operate within 
the structure created. The opportunity for structural ownership was presumably not offered to the 
Bosnians because of the need to quickly create peace, and keep the peace. Offering structural 
ownership to previously warring communities could have led to an inability to compromise or a 




Constitution was on functional ownership of the implementation process on the ground. These 
differences will become clearer in the evaluation of the inaugural elections in both cases, and 



















Chapter Five:  
Local Ownership after the Constitution 
 
 I now explore how characteristics from the constitution-making processes affected the 
concept of local ownership after the implementation of the constitution. I argue that a 
democratic, iterative constitution-making process, as described by the previous chapter, is a 
function of structural ownership. Without providing a path to structural ownership, simple 
functional ownership can lead to the rejection of principles imposed from above.  
 The cases of Japan and Bosnia clearly differ in the inclusion of the local population in 
their constitution making processes and constitutional content. The results of the constitution-
making process and the extent of local ownership were tested by the inaugural elections held in a 
state. Elections are an integral part of any democracy, and both Japanese and Bosnian 
Constitutions include elections within their political structures. One great difference between the 
inaugural elections stems from the fact that Japan’s inaugural elections took place before the 
Constitution was enacted, while Bosnia’s inaugural elections took place after the Constitution 
was in place.  
 After discussions of elections, I touch on changes that occurred in both cases of state-
building that altered the path of the project away from the initial projects’ goals. For Japan, there 
was a reversal of the prior state-building objectives, for Bosnia there was a shift in the power 
structure when the OHR was given more power to accomplish more aspects of the Bosnian 






I. Inaugural Elections  
In Japan, elections were not specifically enumerated in the Potsdam declaration, nor was a 
time frame noted, but the inaugural elections in Japan took place about eight months period after 
the occupation began. In Bosnia, free, fair and democratic elections were one of the tenets of the 
Dayton Agreement. Annex Three of the Dayton Agreement included the provisions that the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would be responsible for the 
elections, and that the elections themselves would take place within six to nine months after the 
Dayton Agreement was signed into force (Dayton Peace Agreement Annex 3, November 21, 
1995). Both inaugural elections took place in a similar time frame after the individual state/peace 
building project began, but varied in whether they came before or after the enactment of the 
Constitution. Participation in elections is a demonstration of functional ownership.  
Japan 
One tenet of the Potsdam Declaration was the formation of democracy based on the will 
of the Japanese people (Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945). In January 1946, in a memo to 
President Truman, Acting Political Advisor George Atcheson described all of the basic 
‘preparatory actions’ for the democratization of Japan having been completed, including the 
purge of the bureaucracy, arrest of major war criminals, mandates for freedom of speech, press 
and assembly and disestablishment of Shinto to name a couple. Atcheson also noted the 
establishment of four new post-war political parties: the Progressives, the Liberals, the Social 
Democrats and the Communists (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VIII, The 




On April 10, 1946, Japan held its first election since the war. Turnout was 72 percent of 
all eligible voters, and women were allowed to vote for the first time. The first election 
demonstrated that the majority of Japanese people voted conservatively, but the great number of 
votes for the Social Democrats demonstrated the desire for change within the population since 
the party previously had received far less votes in pre-war elections (Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 184).  Formerly there had only been 
lawyers and upper class citizens in the Diet, but after the inaugural elections in April there were 
younger people, teachers, farmers and 38 women were elected (MacArthur 1964). There were 
some criticisms that occurred concerning incomplete registration lists throughout Japan, but 
election official negligence was the recorded reason for the errors (Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 184). 
The high turnout in first elections in Japan demonstrated that the Japanese population was 
largely accepting of the new democratic principles of the country. Prior to the election, Japan’s 
constitution-making process had been dominated by Japanese elites and representatives who had 
not been purged, and were selected to work with the U.S. After the election, the newly elected 
representatives selected by a broad majority of the electorate were integral to the final edits and 
approval of the Constitution that went into force on May 3, 1947.  
Bosnia 
Annex Three of the Dayton Accords was dedicated to outlining the necessary conditions 
for democratic elections. The parties needed to ensure that a politically neutral environment 
existed, and that the right to vote without intimidation or fear as well as in secret would be 




encourage freedom of association and freedom of movement. The OSCE was tasked with 
certifying the conditions for the elections and providing assistance to the parties if necessary. 
The OSCE was also assigned to supervise the elections themselves on the state, entity and 
cantonal/municipal levels. According to the Agreement, the elections were to take place between 
six and nine months after the signing of the Dayton Agreement (The General Framework for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 3, November 21, 1995).  
  Prior to the election, the environment had not been made neutral. For example, 
there was evidence of fear-mongering from the Croat Democratic Party (HDZ) materials noting 
that the election determined the “survival of their nation,” and actions like these were most likely 
occurring within each of the ethno-nationalist political parties (International Crisis Group 1996: 
20). There were even explosives found where a meeting was scheduled for the Socialist Party of 
Republika Srpska. Two different opposition leaders to the ruling Bosniak party, the Party of 
Democratic Action (SDA) were physically assaulted before the election (International Crisis 
Group 1996). It was clear that Bosnia was not fostering the neutral political environment 
necessary for free and fair democratic elections.  
The first elections in the post-war period took place on September 14, 1996. According to 
the International Crisis Group, neither entity had met the minimum requirements for elections. 
Because of the failure to begin repatriation and reintegration of refugees, handover indicted war 
criminals and remove roadblocks to freedom of movement and expression, the state of Bosnia 
was not prepared to hold elections based on the requirements listed in the Dayton Agreement. 




efforts to reintegrate once the election results return power to the ethno-nationalist centered 
political parties (International Crisis Group 1996). 
 On Election Day, thousands of voters were either disenfranchised through technical 
errors with voter registration or for fear of crossing the Inter-Entity Boundary line to vote. 
Polling places were calm due to the security preparations that prepared, and because the ruling 
political parties were looking forward to their power being restored officially (International 
Crisis Group 1996).  
 The results of the election demonstrated that nationalist parties triumphed. For the 
tripartite presidency, Bosniak Alija Izetbegovic (SDA) and Croat Kresimir Zubak (HDZ) won 
more than 80 per cent of the vote for their roles. The Serb member, Momcilo Krajisnik (SDS), 
had a less overwhelming victory. Through the certification process of the election, the 
Coordinator for International Monitoring concluded that Bosnia having just emerged from a war, 
and “fulfilling varying degrees” of the conditions of the Dayton Agreement made it difficult to 
assess the extent to which the elections were free and fair (International Crisis Group 1996).  
 Based on these observations of the first election in post-war Bosnia, the locals did not 
take functional ownership in the prescribed way the international community had hoped 
concerning the protocols of the Dayton Agreement set up in preparation for the election, but 
rather locals did take ownership of the election itself while ignoring the standards of Dayton. By 
using fear-mongering and hateful rhetoric, the political parties largely rejected the pre-election 
standards that the Dayton Agreement had created, in order to run election campaigns in the same 
way they were familiar with from pre-war and war times. In sum, this does not mean there is no 




not expected or wanted by the international community. The parties used the election to 
legitimize their own power through international rules.  
 While the election in Japan began to cement democratic norms in the minds of Japanese 
citizens, the Bosnian election legitimized the role of nationalist political parties that had been the 
main perpetrators of the war. Both countries took functional ownership of the elections, but only 
Japan took ownership in the way the international community wanted the country to do so. 
Bosnians still demonstrated functional ownership despite the fact it was in a different way than 
the international community planned. As for control over the political planning aspect of 
structural ownership, Bosnians did not have much if any input into the planning of the first 
elections since that duty was allocated to the OSCE. As for Japan, it is not clearly explained in 
government reports how the first election was managed, but it is likely that it was implemented 
through the Home Ministry by the SCAP. The Home Ministry was an organ of the Japanese 
cabinet that was largely in charge of internal affairs from the Meiji period through the 
occupation, until it was reorganized after the enactment of the new constitution (Duus 1976). 
Therefore, both domestic populations took functional ownership of their inaugural elections, but 
they diverged in meeting the expectations of the international community.  
Election update 
Within Annex Three of the Dayton Agreement, there were specific plans to transfer election 
management to the local Bosnians. In October 2002, Bosnians organized and administered their 
first general election. An OSCE mission observer noted that there were no significant procedural 




2003). This power transfer suggests structural and functional ownership of the electoral process. 
Yet, the problem of nationalist parties dominating still existed.  
II. Transitions in implementation styles in state-building projects  
Beyond elections which took place shortly after the state building projects began, there were 
shifts in the implementation styles of state-building in both the cases of Bosnia and Japan that 
impacted the potential for local ownership. In Bosnia, this transition happened with the 
introduction of the Bonn Powers to the OHR, and in the case of Japan, the transition is captured 
by the rising tensions of the emerging Cold War and changing priorities for the role of Japan.  
Japan 
One of the central tenets of the Occupation in Japan was demilitarization, but when 
threats begin emerging from the Soviet Union, the American occupation forces recalibrated the 
rules of the Occupation. The Marshall Plan, which was meant to supply Europe with foreign aid 
after World War II, also led to the envisioning of independent global zones allied with the United 
States against the Soviet Union, including the United States, a restored Germany and Japan 
(Schaller 1987). Germany and Japan would become regional centers of production and trade, and 
form a linkage of anti-Communist states (Schaller 1987).  
Economic recovery was not an immediate priority of occupation plans, so focusing on 
production and trade was a pivot away from Potsdam. With the new plan of making Japan into a 
regional production center for the war against the Soviet Union, George Kennan, an American 
diplomat known for his containment policy towards the Soviet Union, was sent to Tokyo in 1948 
by Secretary of State Marshall to signal a change in MacArthur’s unilateral power and advise 




‘reverse course’ for Japan. The theme of Kennan’s reverse course for Japan was relaxing 
pressure and undoing policies from the early Occupation period. Kennan suggested changes like 
removing the antimonopoly and reparations programs that had been agenda items in the 
Occupation from the start. Kennan believed that the Japanese would reject the idealistic liberal 
reforms that took place under MacArthur between 1945 and 1947, and instead emphasized a 
need to breed traditional conservative political groups to protect Japan from Communism. 
Kennan wished to give as much authority as possible to the Japanese government and even to 
establish a small army or central police force to combat potential Japanese subversion, which 
was starkly against the original objectives of demilitarization (Schaller 1987). 
The transition in the state-building policy towards Japan was a reversal of the previous 
two years and a large pivot away from the goals of the original occupation. The next step for the 
United States was to transform Japan into a piece of the U.S.’s global military architecture to 
combat the rising threat of the Soviet Union.  The transition from the policies of MacArthur to 
Kennan represented a great hand-off to the Japanese government. In the beginning of the 
occupation, the SCAP structure acted as a dominant force.  After the Kennan trip, the SCAP 
began transitioning into more of a partnership with the Japanese domestic actors especially 
through the government structure. With the policies of Kennan, the political rule of the country 
was handed over to the Japanese as the Americans were concerned with transforming Japan into 
a self-functioning and productive state that could be of use to the American military structure 
against possible confrontations with the Soviet Union. Kennan’s policies emphasized America as 
an ally and a benefactor to Japan, rather than an occupying, ruling force. Kennan’s policies 




their own political powers in a largely unobserved way that had not occurred since before the 
Occupation.   
Bosnia 
The majority of the Dayton Agreement contained the framework for peace building 
efforts, which can be defined by efforts to eliminate violence and create the conditions for a 
stable peace (Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher 2014). Between 1995 and 1997, the international 
organizations present in Bosnia performed the roles they were tasked with achieving from 
Dayton, focusing on the implementation of peace. The OHR played an advisory role for the most 
part, consulting and settling disputes as needed. High Representative Paddy Ashdown later noted 
that Dayton was “designed to end a war, not to build a country” (International Crisis Group 
2003). Yet, in late 1997, the role of the OHR was strengthened by the introduction of the Bonn 
Powers. The creation of the Bonn Powers transitioned the capacity building project in Bosnia 
from peace-building to a more active role in state-building. There were two clear stages of the 
role of the OHR in Bosnia, the first can be described as the immediate post-war period where the 
OHR was focused on implementing the terms of the Dayton Agreement. The second stage was a 
departure from the strict adherence to Dayton, and instead was focused on the EU Accession 
process. After the Thessaloniki European Council summit in June 2003, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was identified as a potential candidate for EU membership, and under High Representative 
Paddy Ashdown the state-building priorities shifted to create a more centralized state and meet 
other goals to fulfill the criteria to join the EU. 
The power of the OHR increased in May 1997, when the Peace Implementation Council 




moved beyond peacekeeping to active intervention, and went as far as to seize the public 
television transmitter towers that the Republika Srpska (RS) controlled, after which the OHR 
demanded the resignation from the entirety of the management. The success of the intervention 
led the PIC to create new powers for the OHR to push through roadblocks to creating a 
centralized state through abilities to implement institutional reform, create legislation and 
remove elected officials at will in order to fulfill the tenets of Dayton (Knaus and Martin 2003).  
The Bonn Powers were used to push through ‘log-jams’ and make decisions in conflicts 
that were important to the functioning of the state that were not quickly or easily solved due to 
disagreement among political groups.  In the early stages, the Bonn Powers were not used often. 
But, after the progress that was made wielding the Bonn Powers, the powers began to be used 
more often as a means to build the state. Carlos Westendorp (1997-1999) was the first to handle 
the Bonn Powers and averaged about four actions per month (Knaus and Martin 2003). Notably, 
Westendorp imposed citizenship and passport laws, chose the design of the common currency 
and pushed authorities to decide on a common license plate (International Crisis Group 1998). 
Paddy Ashdown (2002 – 2006) was the most visible High Representative, who made his 
priorities clear: rule of law, economic reform, responsibility in public office and rationalization 
of government. Ashdown used the Bonn Powers to restructure the entire judicial system in 2002, 
requiring every judge to resign and reapply for their positions. By the end of 2002, more than 
one hundred officials had been dismissed from their post for various reasons (Knaus and Martin 
2003). Ashdown also created a committee of businesspeople to identify obstacles to doing 
business in BiH, which was followed by the removal of 49 laws or regulations. Ashdown 




create plans to further centralize the state of BiH through projects like establishing a state-level 
customs service, introducing a state-level value added tax (VAT), bringing entity-level armies 
under the state-level civilian command structure and creating a state intelligence agency 
(International Crisis Group 2003). Additionally, OHR imposed a law changing the structure of 
the Council of Ministers. The law increased the number of ministries to eight from six, created a 
permanent chairman and provided for a single deputy minister in each ministry. OHR then 
claimed the right to vet ministers on the state level, but also in the entity and cantonal 
governments. Already, the OHR could remove officials from their posts, but now the OHR had a 
say in who was first appointed to positions (International Crisis Group 2003). Paddy Ashdown 
made hefty use of the Bonn Powers, and clocked in at about 14 acts per month (Knaus and 
Martin 2003). As mentioned previously, this transition and greater use of the Bonn Powers by 
Paddy Ashdown was used in hopes of building a state to meet the criteria of the European Union, 
which became the ultimate exit strategy of the International Community.  
The Bonn Powers made Bosnia into a pseudo-protectorate, as the OHR governed by 
decree on the state level and by imposing pressure on the entities.  Meanwhile, entity, cantonal 
and municipal governments still retained relative power over their communities. The existence of 
the OHR and its new role with the use of Bonn Powers was in direct contradiction with the 
objective of fostering local structural ownership but worked directly to accomplish the goals of 
building a central state.  
One could argue that awarding greater power to the OHR was a way to overcome the 
weak institutional structure that was set up by the Dayton Agreement. The structure from Dayton 




consensus that was often out of reach. Bosnians could not operate in an efficient, responsible 
manner, hence the need for a powerful figure to push through the conflicts (International Crisis 
Group 1998). Yet, the instilling of the Bonn Powers to the OHR gave ethno-nationalist 
leadership an excuse not to cooperate.   They could depend on the OHR to manage and build the 
state, while the leadership could focus on scoring political points. 
The Bonn Powers could have also been viewed as part of a creative destruction process in 
which some parts of the state had to be revamped, like the judicial system, essentially from the 
beginning to clear out any corruption ingrained in the structure (Donais 2009; Knaus and Martin 
2003). 
Local Ownership in State-building Strategies 
An interesting similarity that emerges between the cases is the existence of an all-
powerful figure responsible for the state-building process. In Japan it was the SCAP, General 
Douglas MacArthur, who possessed the means to rule over the station of the Emperor and the 
Japanese Government to fulfill the Potsdam Declaration. While in Bosnia, the organization rather 
than a singular figure was the Office of the High Representative, but not until the Bonn Powers 
were introduced in late 1997.  
The strategies of Japan and Bosnia diverged relating to focusing on functional or 
structural ownership. In Bosnia, the international community focused on functional ownership to 
lead to structural ownership. Evidence for functional ownership as the main policy is the first 
election in 1996, where the general political atmosphere of Bosnia did not meet the expectations 
to hold free elections, but were held anyway. The emphasis on functional ownership through the 




Bosnians took ownership of their elections, but not in the way that was prescribed by the 
international community.  
Whereas in Japan, before the inaugural election was held, the emphasis was placed on the 
new Constitution and therefore structural ownership. Japan’s focus on structural ownership is 
proved by the dominant powers of the SCAP from the inception of the Occupation in Japan. 
Working with Japanese elites before the first election demonstrated a focus on structural 
ownership, where the domestic actors themselves, even if not entirely representative of the 
population, had input on perhaps the most influential planning and strategic document to guide 
the state, the Constitution. While the exit strategies of most state-building projects include the 
handing over of responsibilities for both functional and structural ownership, in Japan and 
Bosnia the strategy of focusing on functional or structural ownership greatly affected the 
outcomes of the initial years of the state-building project.  
After 1997 the OHR’s shift away from functional ownership towards structural 
ownership align with the strategies employed with SCAP General MacArthur towards creating a 
product of a democratic, centralized state. The recalibration occurred because the premature 
emphasis on functional ownership from the beginning of the peace-building project led domestic 
actors to employ their divisive actions from war times. The international organizations largely 
served to keep peace, monitor implementation and set up the scaffolding of the state for the 
Bosnian people to operate within, but there was no clear leadership to guide the Bosnian people 
towards the specified outcomes of the international community. By emphasizing functional 




to take ownership of the political structures like elections and the government institutions to 
recreate the war-time political environment that had become habitual.  
 After the Bonn Powers were allocated to the OHR, the term ‘ownership,’ became more 
prominent in the taxonomy of state-builders, but the focus was shifted to building a centralized 
state operated by Bosnian domestic actors to comply with the EU Accession goals, rather than 
domestic actors simply living within the initial scaffolding of Dayton. The issue of local 
ownership and exit strategy was deterred in order to prioritize the construction and operation of 
the state.  
III. Conclusion 
Based on the success of Japan and the reorientation of the Bosnian state-building project, 
it seems that emphasizing structural ownership is a successful state-building strategy. The key 
question is based on when domestic actors can be trusted to enact and live by the international 
standards imposed from above. When is the structure of a state sturdy enough to foster 
democratic ideals and liberal principles without sewing division? When can the international 
community pack up their things and leave the governing to the locals for good? When can a 
target country be considered a success as a state-building project? When can they be considered 
an ally instead of a project? 
  While internationals maintain a powerful role within a target state in roles like SCAP or 
the OHR, there are going to be criticisms about colonial tactics. In violence prone areas, isn’t 
peace preferred to war? Ed Joseph notes that in some societies domestic actors are simply unable 
to take over state functions without violence immediately after a war, and to some extent that 




Bosnia (Joseph 2007). If war is inevitable to some degree, would not the international 
community prefer pseudo-colonial tactics instead of lost lives and genocide? This reasoning 
leads to the conclusion that structural ownership is key, but first international interveners with 
strong powers must seek to replace old habits with new institutions and principles that align with 
liberal and democratic values. In the case of Japan, SCAP had ultimate power over the 
governance of Japan, and the Occupation emphasized the need for the removal of militaristic 
aspects and replacement with democratic mechanisms. Through the inclusion of domestic actors 
and staunch guidance from SCAP, Japan transitioned from a once militaristic state, to that of a 
functioning liberal democratic state.  
Local ownership is important for states to function independently and effectively in the 
long run, but perhaps the lesson that the cases of Japan and Bosnia demonstrate is that new 
structures of governance and institutions have to be taught and domestic actors have to be 















Chapter Six:  
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to prove the connection between democratically 
written constitutions and structural ownership, and therefore more successful state-building 
outcomes. First, I explored the similarities and differences between the end of conflicts that led 
to state-building in Japan and Bosnia; then, I made comparisons between the constitution-making 
processes to isolate specific factors like the nature of the conflict and the actors involved. I 
concluded that the greatest difference between the two cases was the democratic and iterative 
constitution making process in Japan and the imposition of the new Constitution without local 
input in Bosnia, which was largely due to the context of the war ending. After this conclusion, I 
explored the content of the Constitutions, which demonstrated the salient principles the 
international community wished to impose. The constitutional content revealed how a 
democratic constitution-making process versus a non-democratic constitution-making process 
led to specific tenets in the Constitutions.  
 With these conclusions, I then investigated the inaugural elections and changes in state-
building projects for both cases. In both cases, the inaugural elections included broad amounts of 
participation by domestic actors, but in Bosnia the ownership led to the recreation of a similar 
political environment that incited the ethno-nationalist conflict to begin with. Then, I connected 
this difference to the different aspects of local ownership: functional and structural ownership. I 
argued that Japan and Bosnia differed in their approaches to state-building as proved by their 
constitution-making processes: the IC in Japan emphasized structural ownership, while the IC in 
Bosnia emphasized functional ownership. The international community in Japan viewed 




partnership with SCAP to democratically write and later enact a new Constitution. In the case of 
Bosnia, functional ownership was emphasized in hopes that increased contact between ethno-
nationalist political groups would increase cooperation in building a state in the long-run. Yet, by 
emphasizing functional ownership as soon as possible without working with the population, 
since the Constitution was imposed from above, domestic actors reverted to the same divisive 
habits they were familiar with in the inaugural election.  
 The transitions in the state-building projects section demonstrated that the international 
community in Bosnia shifted its strategy, from that of emphasizing functional ownership 
immediately, which had largely proven unsuccessful, to structural ownership facilitated by 
building the state via the Bonn Powers allocated to the OHR. The roles of the SCAP and OHR 
were incredibly similar in that they were used to implement policies in order to build an efficient, 
democratic central state, and they had few restrictions on their powers.  
 Through focusing on structural ownership in the state-building project in Japan, the 
supreme powers of SCAP were used to efficiently demilitarize and democratize. The transition in 
the state-building project for Japan was largely due to the changing geopolitical atmosphere as 
the Cold War approached, but also to reign in the great powers SCAP controlled in order to 
officially hand ownership to the Japanese.  
 In summation, the cases prove that focusing on structural ownership, rather than 
functional ownership, led to the formation of the communication structure between international 
powers and the domestic population, that led to the outcomes in both constitution-making and 
the inaugural elections. The inaugural elections demonstrated the efficiency to which Japan 




not, which led to the pivot in state-building strategy to match that of earlier Japan’s. This pivot 
demonstrates the necessity to lead the state-building effort by focusing on local ownership as an 
end goal rather than a policy.  
I. Alternative Explanations 
There are a variety of alternative explanations than the one that I argued for in this work, all 
of which could be researched further. I will touch on the following alternative explanations for 
greater local ownership and an independently functioning Japan, and an often gridlocked 
dependent Bosnia: 1) pre-existing political conditions; 2) diversity of population; 3) strength of 
Constitution.  
First, some scholars attribute the success of the state-building mission in Japan to the fact that 
it maintained a democratic structure and civil society before World War II (Dobbins 2003). The 
suggested difference is that Japan maintained a civil society in a way that most communist states 
could not. Therefore, rebuilding a democratic state and civil society was much easier because a 
similar structure had existed in the past 
Second, Japan was composed of a largely homogenous population, and Bosnia had an 
incredibly heterogeneous and diverse population. There were no divides in the population of 
Japan beyond political beliefs and perhaps regional differences, whereas in Bosnia there was a 
variety of nationalities, ethnicities and religions that were politically mobilized against each 
other. Bosnia had a hurdle in their state-building project that Japan never could have had. The 
only thing close to division within Japanese society was the presence of extremely militant 
figures that mobilized the population under a united belief in Japanese superiority, but that was 




Bosnia of the same fashion, until perhaps the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. 
Diversity of population is one of the greatest challenges for the Bosnian state-building project, 
and it does not have equal parallels in Japan.  
Lastly, there is an argument to be made that the Bosnian Constitution was simply flawed in a 
way that makes cooperation among communities and consolidating a central state almost 
impossible. The Constitution legitimizes a division between the three political ethno-nationalist 
and reinforces the division in institutions and territory. A perfect Constitution cannot create a 
perfect state, but a flawed constitution leads to an uneven foundational for the rest of the state to 
be built upon. In Japan, the only conceivable parallel to the flawed constitution structure would 
be the War Clause or the Emperor becoming a symbolic rather than supreme figure, but these did 
not affect the operation of the governance structure as much as institutionalizing the nationalist 
parties did in the Bosnian Constitution.  
Japan and Bosnia are not easily comparable in their histories or their state-building projects, 
but the opposite strategies pursued by state builders reveal some truths about success in state-
building projects. Japan and Bosnia had similarities in their constitutions that had to do with 
building a liberal, democratic state, but the way they arrived at their final constitution differed. 
The ultimate pivot of the PIC and the powers of the OHR were the key mechanism that 
demonstrated the importance of focusing on building structural ownership. If the goal is to instill 
democratic values and structures into a society, it is clear that international interveners cannot 
simply gift a structure and a constitution, but need to seek a form of partnership or way to 
exchange ideas to build a state. One scholar suggests the best way forward in future state-




both ways rather than a hierarchal command structure (Donais 2009). Cultural exchange solves 
many of the issues that critics have concerning state-building violating norms of sovereignty. I 
would argue that Japan’s democratic constitution-making process was a step in the right 
direction towards the strategy of cultural exchange, whereas the imposition of the constitution 
from above is opposite from cultural exchange, and rather is paternalistic and anti-democratic.  
In a contradictory way, the imposition of supreme power over Japan by the SCAP 
immediately seems colonial and a violation of sovereignty, but ultimately the SCAP was able to 
relinquish power in a way that led to ownership by the Japanese people. The Constitution of 
Japan has not been amended since 1947, demonstrating ownership of the guiding document of 
the state. Additionally, Japan become an independent and functional state, so much so that Japan 
actually contributes money to the functioning of the OHR in Bosnia to this day. In Bosnia, the 
immediate allowance of domestic actors to operate within the democratic structures led to the 
democratic legitimation of nationalist parties, and not until more power was given to the OHR 
was the course corrected.  
The argument for an initial strong force in state-building could sound like I am arguing for 
the allowance for a kind of ‘benevolent dictatorship,’ but I would like to make it clear that I do 
not believe in the long-term rule of a foreign leader in a country that is not their own. Yet, the 
necessity to end violence and build up state capacity, before offering structural ownership to 
domestic actors, is evident. No society can function without peace, or institutions for the 
production and management of public goods (Olson 1993). Therefore, an international arbiter 
could be essential to the rehabilitation of weak and failed states. As long as there is a dialogue 




stable base of peace and basic institutions, perhaps can be built by foreign powers for the sake of 
establishing a foundation of state capacity.  Perhaps an analogy will best capture this thinking. 
Suppose a friend or family member of yours undergoes knee surgery. They cannot get around 
easily and they are reliant on you and their physical therapist to supply meals and other basic 
needs, and support and training to ease into their new state of new knees. If they were to get out 
of surgery and immediately told to walk, they risk grave injury and pain. Yet, if you and their 
physical therapist continue to dote on them for too long, they may take advantage and walk 
rarely or not at all. The role you and the physical therapist serve is to provide support and 
guidance in teaching the person to operate independently. Just as a person cannot immediately 
operate on their own after surgery, neither can a state that undergoes damaging incidents of 
violence and war. State-builders play the role of the friend and/or physical therapist: they seek to 
teach how to operate in a new way with an end goal in mind that their patient will operate 
independently and should not be expected to, nor should they try to, manage their ‘patient’ 
forever.  
I have spent the majority of this work arguing for the importance of maintaining a central 
focus on structural ownership, which leads to the adoption of acts like democratic constitution-
making processes. Yet, it is important to note the most important difference between Japan and 
Bosnia was how their wars ended. The end of war created the array of possible strategies that the 
international community could take on to state-build. In the case of Japan, the country had 
suffered a clear loss and were the losers of the war, so the ability of the U.S. and IC to be so 
effective could be attributed to the fact the Japanese population had no good options for recourse. 
The Japanese population, to some extent, were at the will of the American occupation forces. 




contributed to the success of imposing international standards from above. Even in the Japanese 
language, there is a large emphasis on hierarchy and respect, and as mentioned earlier in the pre-
war period Japanese citizens were expected to bow to places of importance in Shinto, these 
cultural standards also could have led to the ease of international ideals being imposed. Whereas, 
in the Bosnian case, there was no true winner, nor loser, and therefore the communities involved 
had more options to push back against the impositions from the IC. The peace that was 
established at Dayton was done by the highest levels of leaders without much, if any 
involvement from the general populace, which could mean there was a difference between the 
compromises made in Dayton from the needs or wants from the communities on the ground. All 
this to say, the way the wars ended greatly affected the strategies the IC could utilize to state-
build, and could have been the determining factor to lead to centering structural ownership and 
therefore the democratic constitution-making processes.  
All in all, if there are to be more state-building exercises in the future, it is important to 
center structural ownership, and bring domestic actors into the planning process of state-building 
in order to come closer to cultural exchange. These cases show the immediate participation of 
domestic actors via emphasizing functional ownership is not always ideal, and could lead to 
cementing past belief systems and relationship networks within the new democratic system. 
While both Japan and Bosnia had policies and internationalized Constitutions imposed from 
above, it was seeking to create structural ownership that was most successful in building a state 
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